Title: Modify PTP Obligation Bid Clearing Change
Next Group:
Next Step:
Status: Approved on 08/08/2017
Effective Dates:


Date Gov Body Action Taken Next Steps
08/08/2017 BOARD Approved
07/27/2017 TAC Recommended for Approval Board for consideration
07/20/2017 PRS Recommended for Approval TAC for consideration
06/15/2017 PRS Deferred/Tabled PRS for consideration

Voting Record

Date Gov Body Motion Result
08/08/2017 BOARD To approve NPRR833 as recommended by TAC in the 7/27/17 TAC Report Passed
07/27/2017 TAC To recommend approval of NPRR833 as recommended by PRS in the 7/20/17 PRS Report Passed
07/20/2017 PRS To grant NPRR833 Urgent status. To recommend approval of NPRR833 as amended by the 6/29/17 ERCOT comments and to forward to TAC with a recommended priority of 2017 and rank of 1945 Passed
06/15/2017 PRS To table NPRR833 for one month and refer the issue to WMS Passed

Vote tallies here reflect individual votes, not the weight of the votes by market segment. Affirmative votes are not recorded in these vote tallies. For additional details on the voting record, please consult the Recommendation or Action Report, or the official vote tally if available, as posted in the key documents.


Status: Approved
Date Posted: May 31, 2017
Sponsor: ERCOT
Urgent: Yes
Sections: 4.5.1
Description: This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) adjusts the language introduced by NPRR827, Disallow PTP Obligation Bid Award where Clearing Price exceeds Bid Price by $0.25/MW per hour, to account for the steady state that will result when ERCOT implements the long-term, automated change affecting Point-to-Point (PTP) Obligation bid clearing. With NPRR827, ERCOT introduced a manual workaround to remove certain awards that were considered in the optimization, which negatively impacts counterflow in DAM Settlement. With this NPRR, ERCOT will update the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) optimization engine to address the situation where a contingency disconnects a Resource Node. Instead of ignoring the PTP MWs in contingency analysis if that PTP sources or sinks at the disconnected point, the engine will “pick up” those MWs and distribute them to other nodes. The Settlement Point Price will include that “pick up” Shift Factor in the price calculation. In this implementation, the optimization price and the Settlement price will be equal (within one cent for rounding).
Reason: Addresses current operational issues

Key Documents

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