Title: Day-Ahead Market and Real-Time Market Default Allocation Changes
Next Group:
Next Step:
Status: Approved on 06/15/2010
Effective Dates:

or per the Nodal Protocol Transition Plan http://www.ercot.com/mktrules/protocols (07/01/10 Nodal Protocols Library)


Date Gov Body Action Taken Next Steps
05/20/2010 PRS Recommended for Approval TAC consideration of NPRR221
06/15/2010 BOARD Approved
04/22/2010 PRS Recommended for Approval PRS for Impact Analysis review.
06/03/2010 TAC Recommended for Approval ERCOT Board consideration of NPRR221

Voting Record

Date Gov Body Motion Result
05/20/2010 PRS To endorse and forward the 4/22/10 PRS Report, as amended by the 5/7/10 ERCOT comments, and Impact Analysis for NPRR221 to TAC. Passed
06/15/2010 BOARD To approve NPRR221 as recommended by TAC in the 6/3/10 TAC Report. Passed
04/22/2010 PRS To recommend approval of NPRR221 as revised by PRS. Passed
06/03/2010 TAC To recommend approval of NPRR221 as recommended by PRS in the 5/20/10 PRS Report. Passed

Vote tallies here reflect individual votes, not the weight of the votes by market segment. Affirmative votes are not recorded in these vote tallies. For additional details on the voting record, please consult the Recommendation or Action Report, or the official vote tally if available, as posted in the key documents.


Status: Approved
Date Posted: Mar 29, 2010
Sponsor: MCWG
Urgent: No
Sections: 9.1.2, 9.4.1, 9.4.2, 9.4.3, 9.4.5, 9.7.2, 9.7.3,,,,, 9.7.5, 9.19, 9.19.1, 9.19.2,,
Description: This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) changes the way default amounts (amounts owed to ERCOT by defaulting Counter-Party 180 days after the default occurs) in the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) and Real-Time Market (RTM) are allocated. This NPRR assigns a share of the default to each Counter-Party based on the greatest of the Counter-Party’s MWh activity in either the CRR market or DAM or RTM at the Counter-Party level for the calendar month prior to the month in which the default occurs. The Counter-Party share of the default is invoiced to the Counter-Party’s Qualified Scheduling Entities (QSEs) or Congestion Revenue Right (CRR) Account Holders, pro rata based on each of the Counter-Party QSE’s or Counter-Party CRR Account Holder’s share of the Counter-Party’s maximum MWh activity. The level of MWh activity in the CRR market and DAM is measured as the greater of the MWh purchases or sales in that market and the level of MWh activity in the RTM is measured as the greater of the Counter-Party’s MWh Load or generation, excluding generation from Reliability Must-Run (RMR) Resources and other Resources during Reliability Unit Commitment (RUC)-Committed Intervals. Language that currently exists in Sections 9.4.3 and 9.7.3 was consolidated and used to create new Section 9.19. This NPRR also accelerates the DAM Invoice payment due date by one day. This NPRR also includes revisions to synchronize the Nodal Protocols with the zonal Protocols as revised by Protocol Revision Request (PRR) 817, Cease Late Payment Charges for Defaulted Entities, to clarify how much security may be held back to be used to pay subsequent minor Invoices as they come due.
Reason: This NPRR alleviates concerns about DAM participation in the event of a large default in the DAM. Instead of short paying DAM sales for default amounts in the DAM and only allocating to QSEs on a Load Ratio Share basis for default amounts in the RTM, this NPRR allocates default amounts to all QSEs and CRR Account Holders based on their maximum level of MWh activity in ERCOT-run markets. This NPRR also reduces exposure to defaults in the DAM by accelerating the DAM Invoice payment due date by one day.

Key Documents

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