Title Settlement of Infeasible Ancillary Services Due to Transmission Constraints
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Next Step
Status Approved on 10/11/2016
Effective Dates


Date Gov Body Action Taken Next steps
10/11/2016 BOARD Approved
08/25/2016 TAC Recommended for Approval Board for consideration
08/11/2016 PRS Recommended for Approval TAC for consideration
07/14/2016 PRS Recommended for Approval PRS for Impact Analysis review
06/16/2016 PRS Deferred/Tabled PRS for consideration

Voting Record

Date Gov Body Motion Result
10/11/2016 BOARD To approve NPRR782 as recommended by TAC in the 8/25/16 TAC Report Passed
08/25/2016 TAC To recommend approval of NPRR782 as recommended by PRS in the 8/11/16 PRS Report Passed
08/11/2016 PRS To endorse and forward to TAC the 7/14/16 PRS Report and Impact Analysis for NPRR782 with a recommended priority of 2016 and rank of 1730 Passed
07/14/2016 PRS To recommend approval of NPRR782 as submitted Passed
06/16/2016 PRS To table NPRR782 and refer the issue to WMS Passed


Status: Approved
Date Posted: Jun 1, 2016
Sponsor: ERCOT
Urgent: No
Sections:, 5.5.2, 6.4.7,,,,,, (new), 6.7.4, 9.5.3
Description: This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) removes inconsistencies in Protocol language with a proposed change to the equations governing the Settlement of Ancillary Services for Resources that are not able to deliver on their Ancillary Service responsibilities due to transmission constraints. ERCOT collaborated with members of the Wholesale Market Subcommittee (WMS) and Qualified Scheduling Entity (QSE) Managers Working Group (QMWG) to address the inconsistencies in the Protocols and develop a proposal for the Settlement of infeasible Ancillary Services due to transmission constraints. ERCOT has drafted an NPRR based on the following Settlement principles: 1) The QSE with the infeasible Ancillary Service(s) will be charged the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) clearing price regardless whether the responsibility was awarded, self-arranged, or traded, and regardless of whether a Supplemental Ancillary Service Market (SASM) is executed. 2) The Ancillary Service replacement cost, if any, is charged to all QSEs based on the current Settlement allocation (Load Ratio Share (LRS) less self-arranged). 3) The QSE with the Ancillary Service infeasibility is not directly charged the full replacement cost, if any. 4) All revenues collected from charges to QSEs due to infeasible Ancillary Service(s) are paid to all QSEs based on the current Settlement allocation (LRS less self-arranged).
Reason: Addresses current operational issues; market efficiency/enhancement

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