Vote tallies here reflect individual votes, not the weight of the votes by market segment.
Affirmative votes are not recorded in these vote tallies. For additional details on the voting
record, please consult the Recommendation or Action Report, or the official vote tally if
available, as posted in the key documents.
This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) removes inconsistencies in Protocol language with a proposed change to the equations governing the Settlement of Ancillary Services for Resources that are not able to deliver on their Ancillary Service responsibilities due to transmission constraints. ERCOT collaborated with members of the Wholesale Market Subcommittee (WMS) and Qualified Scheduling Entity (QSE) Managers Working Group (QMWG) to address the inconsistencies in the Protocols and develop a proposal for the Settlement of infeasible Ancillary Services due to transmission constraints.
ERCOT has drafted an NPRR based on the following Settlement principles:
1) The QSE with the infeasible Ancillary Service(s) will be charged the Day-Ahead Market (DAM) clearing price regardless whether the responsibility was awarded, self-arranged, or traded, and regardless of whether a Supplemental Ancillary Service Market (SASM) is executed.
2) The Ancillary Service replacement cost, if any, is charged to all QSEs based on the current Settlement allocation (Load Ratio Share (LRS) less self-arranged).
3) The QSE with the Ancillary Service infeasibility is not directly charged the full replacement cost, if any.
4) All revenues collected from charges to QSEs due to infeasible Ancillary Service(s) are paid to all QSEs based on the current Settlement allocation (LRS less self-arranged).
Addresses current operational issues; market efficiency/enhancement