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NPRR576

Summary

Title: Changing Non-Spin Service to be Dispatched by ERCOT (formerly "Changing Non-Spin Service to an Off-Line Service")
Next Group:
Next Step:
Status: Approved on 04/08/2014
Effective Dates:
06/01/2014

Action

Date Gov Body Action Taken Next Steps
04/08/2014 BOARD Approved
03/27/2014 TAC Recommended for Approval ERCOT Board for consideration
03/18/2014 PRS Recommended for Approval TAC for consideration
11/21/2013 PRS Deferred/Tabled PRS language consideration

Voting Record

Date Gov Body Motion Result
04/08/2014 BOARD To approved NPRR576 as recommended by TAC in the 3/27/14 TAC Report. Passed
03/27/2014 TAC To recommend approval of NPRR576 as recommended by PRS in the 3/18/14 PRS Report, as amended by the 3/25/14 CPS comments, and as revised by TAC with a recommendation of $75 per MWh as the minimum offer floor for On-Line Non-Spin. Passed
03/18/2014 PRS To recommend approval of NPRR576 as amended by the 3/18/14 CPS Energy comments and as revised by PRS, and to forward it to TAC; and requested that TAC assign a value to X. Passed
11/21/2013 PRS To table NPRR576 and to refer issues to ROS and WMS. Passed

Vote tallies here reflect individual votes, not the weight of the votes by market segment. Affirmative votes are not recorded in these vote tallies. For additional details on the voting record, please consult the Recommendation or Action Report, or the official vote tally if available, as posted in the key documents.

Background

Status: Approved
Date Posted: Oct 24, 2013
Sponsor: GDF Suez NA Inc.
Urgent: Yes
Sections: 2.1, 3.8.3, 3.17.3, 6.4.3.2, 6.5.7.5, 6.5.7.6.2.3, 8.1.1.2.1.3, 8.1.1.3.3, 8.1.1.4.3
Description: This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) continues to allow On-Line Non-Spin, but places it behind the High Ancillary Service Limit (HASL). This NPRR also proposes the reinstatement of a minimum offer floor for On-Line Non-Spin, but leaves the determination of its value (value of X) to TAC.
Reason: Currently Non-Spin can be provided by On-Line Generation Resources which are always available to Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED). This creates several issues both from a reliability and market perspective. It reduces reliability because it is being deployed before it is needed therefore no longer there when it is truly needed; and if Entities know this is coming in, they have less MWs in SCED, thus the total available response in system is lower at all times. From a market perspective On-Line Non-Spinning reserves create a non-linearity in prices, thus preventing true scarcity prices as the large amount of On-Line creates an artificial buffer in the supply stack.

Key Documents

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