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| NPRR Number | [1078](http://www.ercot.com/mktrules/issues/NPRR1078) | NPRR Title | Clarification of Potential Uplift |
| Date of Decision | August 10, 2021 |
| Action | Recommended Approval |
| Timeline  | Urgent - Given the imminent commencement of the default uplift process, and the substantial amounts due to be recovered, urgency is requested to clarify the calculation of the “Potential Uplift” (PUL) component to ensure more accurate collateralization of Counter-Parties. |
| Proposed Effective Date | Upon Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT) approval – August 20, 2021 |
| Priority and Rank Assigned | Not applicable |
| Nodal Protocol Sections Requiring Revision  | 16.11.4.1, Determination of Total Potential Exposure for a Counter-Party |
| Related Documents Requiring Revision/Related Revision Requests | None |
| Revision Description | This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) clarifies the definition of potential uplift within the calculation of a Counter-Party’s “Total Potential Exposure Any” (TPEA). |
| Reason for Revision |  Addresses current operational issues. Meets Strategic goals (tied to the [ERCOT Strategic Plan](http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/144926/ERCOT_Strategic_Plan_2019-2023.pdf) or directed by the ERCOT Board). Market efficiencies or enhancements Administrative Regulatory requirements Other: (explain)*(please select all that apply)* |
| Business Case | As discussed at the May 19, 2021 Credit Work Group (Credit WG) meeting, the existing definition of PUL contains ambiguous language carried over from the Zonal Protocols which would benefit from clarification to ensure collateralization of uplift charges is consistent with amounts due to ERCOT from Counter-Parties.The language proposed in this NPRR is intended to ensure only amounts due to be paid by Counter-Parties to ERCOT through the default uplift process are subject to collateralization and to also set a limit on the amount collateralized to prevent further financial harm to Market Participants as a result of this default cost recovery process. |
| Credit Work Group Review | See 6/16/21 Credit WG comments |
| PRS Decision | On 6/10/21, PRS unanimously voted to grant NPRR1078 Urgent status; to recommend approval of NPRR1078 as revised by PRS; and to forward to TAC NPRR1078. All Market Segments participated in the vote. |
| Summary of PRS Discussion | On 6/10/21, the sponsor provided an overview of NPRR1078 and proposed desktop edits to lower the proposed limit from “ten years’ worth” to “five years’ worth” of uplift charges. |
| TAC Decision | On 6/23/21, TAC voted via roll call to recommend approval of NPRR1078 as recommended by PRS in the 6/10/21 PRS Report and the Impact Analysis for NPRR1078 with a recommended effective date of upon ERCOT Board approval. There was one abstention from the Municipal (CPS Energy) Market Segment. All Market Segments participated in the vote. |
| Summary of TAC Discussion | On 6/23/21, there was no discussion. |
| ERCOT Opinion | ERCOT supports approval of NPRR1078. |
| ERCOT Market Impact Statement | ERCOT Staff has reviewed NPRR1078 and believes the market impact for NPRR1078 provides one or more of the following benefits: transparency, efficiency, and/or reliability; and/or aligns with current market rules. |
| Board Decision | On 8/10/21, the ERCOT Board recommended approval of NPRR1078 as recommended by TAC in the 6/23/21 TAC Report with a recommended effective date of upon PUCT approval. |

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| Sponsor |
| Name | Bill Barnes |
| E-mail Address | bill.barnes@nrg.com |
| Company | Reliant Energy Retail Services LLC |
| Phone Number | 512-691-6137 |
| Cell Number | 315-885-5925 |
| Market Segment | Independent Retail Electric Provider (IREP) |

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| **Market Rules Staff Contact** |
| **Name** | Cory Phillips |
| **E-Mail Address** | cory.phillips@ercot.com |
| **Phone Number** | 512-248-6464 |

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| **Comments Received** |
| Comment Author | **Comment Summary** |
| Credit WG 061621 | Endorsed NPRR1078 noting positive credit impacts as it appropriately margins Market Participants for known credit risk related to future default allocation |
| CPS Energy 062221 | Abstained from the TAC vote on NPRR1078 due to pending litigation in which CPS Energy has challenged the constitutionality of the policy underlying Section 16.11.4.1 |

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| **Market Rules Notes** |

Please note that the following NPRR(s) also propose revisions to the following section(s):

* NPRR1067, Market Entry Qualifications, Continued Participation Requirements, and Credit Risk Assessment
	+ Section 16.11.4.1

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| Proposed Protocol Language Revision |

**16.11.4.1 Determination of Total Potential Exposure for a Counter-Party**

(1) A Counter-Party’s TPE is the sum of its “Total Potential Exposure Any” (TPEA) and TPES:

(a) TPEA is the positive net exposure of the Counter-Party that may be satisfied by any forms of Financial Security defined under paragraphs (1)(a) through (1)(d) of Section 16.11.3, Alternative Means of Satisfying ERCOT Creditworthiness Requirements. TPEA will include all exposure not included in TPES.

(b) TPES is the positive net exposure of the Counter-Party that may be satisfied only by forms of Financial Security defined under paragraphs (1)(b) through (1)(d) of Section 16.11.3. The Future Credit Exposure (FCE) that reflects the future mark-to-market value for CRRs registered in the name of the Counter-Party is included in TPES.

(2) For all Counter-Parties:

TPEA = Max [0, MCE, Max [0, ((1-TOA) \* EAL *q* + TOA \* EAL *t* +EAL *a*)]] + PUL

TPES = Max [0, FCE *a*] + IA

The above variables are defined as follows:

| **Variable** | **Unit** | **Description** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| EAL *q* | $ | *Estimated Aggregate Liability for all QSEs that represents Load or generation*—EAL for all QSEs represented by the Counter-Party if at least one QSE represented by the Counter-Party represents either Load or generation. |
| EAL *t* | $ | *Estimated Aggregate Liability for all QSEs* —EAL for all QSEs represented by the Counter-Party if none of the QSEs represented by the Counter-Party represent either Load or generation. |
| EAL *a* | $ | *Estimated Aggregate Liability for all CRR Account Holders*—EAL for all CRR Account Holders represented by the Counter-Party. |
| PUL | $ | *Potential Uplift*—Potential uplift to the Counter-Party, to the extent and in the proportion that the Counter-Party represents Entities to which an uplift of a short payment will be made pursuant to Section 9.19, Partial Payments by Invoice Recipients. It is calculated as the sum of: (a) Amounts expected to be uplifted within one year of the date of the calculation; and (b) the lesser of: (1) 25% of amounts expected to be uplifted beyond one year of the date of the calculation; or (2) five years’ worth of uplift charges.  |
| FCE *a* | $ | *Future Credit Exposure for all CRR Account Holders*—FCE for all CRR Account Holders represented by the Counter-Party. |
| MCE | $ | *Minimum Current Exposure*—For each Counter-Party, ERCOT shall determine a Minimum Current Exposure (MCE) as follows: MCE = Max[RFAF \* MAF \* Max[{$\sum\_{e}^{ }\sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $**[**L *i, od, p* \* RTSPP *i, od, p*]/*n*}, {$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $**[[[**L *i, od, p* \* *T2***-** G *i, od, p* \* (1-*NUCADJ*) \* *T3*] \* RTSPP *i, od, p*] + [RTQQNET *i, od, p*\* *T5*]]**/***n*},  {$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $**[**G *i, od, p* \* *NUCADJ* \* *T1* \* RTSPP *i, od, p***]/**n}, {$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $DARTNET*i, od, p* \* *T4*/*n*}], MAF \* IMCE]RTQQNET *i, od, p* = Max**[(**RTQQES *i, od, p, c -*RTQQEP *i, od, p, c*), *BTCF* \* (RTQQES *i, od, p, c* – RTQQEP *i, od, p, c*)] \* RTSPP *i, od, p*DARTNET *i, od, p*  = DAM EOO Cleared *i, od, p* \* DART *i, od, p*+ DAM TPO Cleared *i, od, p* \* DART *i, od, p* + DAM PTP Cleared *i, od, p* \* DARTPTP *i, od, p*– DAM EOB Cleared *i, od, p* \* DART *i, od, p* Where:G *i, od, p* = *Total Metered Generation at all Resource Nodes* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*L *i, od, p* = *Total Adjusted Metered Load (AML) at all Load Zones* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*MAF = *Market Adjustment Factor*—Used to provide for the potential for overall price increases based on changes to ERCOT market rules or market conditions. This factor shall not be set below 100%. Revisions to this factor will be recommended by the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the ERCOT Finance and Audit (F&A) Committee, and approved by the ERCOT Board. Such revisions shall be implemented on the 45th calendar day following ERCOT Board approval unless otherwise directed by the ERCOT Board.*NUCADJ*= *Net Unit Contingent Adjustment*—To allow for situations where a generator may unintentionally or intentionally meet its requirement from the Real-Time Market (RTM)RTQQNET *i, od, p* = *Net QSE-to-QSE Energy Trades* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*RTQQES *i, od, p, c* = *QSE Energy Trades* for which the Counter-Party is the seller for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p* with Counter-Party *c*RTQQEP *i, od, p, c* = *QSE Energy Trades* for which the Counter-Party is the buyer for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p* with Counter-Party *c**BTCF* = *Bilateral Trades Credit Factor*RTSPP *i, od, p* = *Real-Time Settlement Point Price* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DARTNET *i, od, p* = *Net DAM activities* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DART *i, od, p* = *Day-Ahead - Real-Time Spread* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM EOB Cleared*i, od, p* = *DAM Energy Only Bids Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM EOO Cleared *i, od, p* = *DAM Energy Only Offers Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM TPO Cleared *i, od, p* = *DAM Three-Part Offers Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM PTP Cleared *i, od, p* = *DAM Point-to-Point (PTP) Obligations Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DARTPTP *i, od, p* = *Day-Ahead - Real-Time Spread* for value of PTP Obligation for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p**c* = Bilateral Counter-Party *cif = Cap Interval Factor* - Represents the historic largest percentage of System-Wide Offer Cap (SWCAP) intervals during a calendar day*e* = Most recent *n* Operating Days for which RTM Initial Settlement Statements are available*i* = Settlement Interval*n* = Days used for averaging*nm =* Notional Multiplier*od* = Operating Day*p* = A Settlement Point |
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| ***[NPRR1013: Replace the variable “MCE” above with the following upon system implementation of the Real-Time Co-Optimization (RTC) project:]***

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| MCE | $ | *Minimum Current Exposure*—For each Counter-Party, ERCOT shall determine a Minimum Current Exposure (MCE) as follows: MCE = Max[RFAF \* MAF \* Max[{$\sum\_{e}^{ }\sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $**[**L *i, od, p* \* RTSPP *i, od, p*]/*n*}, {$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $**[[[**L *i, od, p* \* *T2***-** G *i, od, p* \* (1-*NUCADJ*) \* *T3*] \* RTSPP *i, od, p*] + [RTQQNET *i, od, p*\* *T5*]]**/***n*},  {$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $**[**G *i, od, p* \* *NUCADJ* \* *T1* \* RTSPP *i, od, p***]/**n}, {{$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} \sum\_{p}^{ } $DARTNET*i, od, p* \* *T4*/*n*} $+${$\sum\_{e}^{ } \sum\_{i=1}^{96} $DARTASONET *i, od, c \* T4/n*}}], MAF \* IMCE]RTQQNET *i, od, p* = Max**[(**RTQQES *i, od, p, c -*RTQQEP *i, od, p, c*), *BTCF* \* (RTQQES *i, od, p, c* – RTQQEP *i, od, p, c*)] \* RTSPP *i, od, p*DARTNET *i, od, p*  = DAM EOO Cleared *i, od, p* \* DART *i, od, p*+ DAM TPO Cleared *i, od, p* \* DART *i, od, p* + DAM PTP Cleared *i, od, p* \* DARTPTP *i, od, p*– DAM EOB Cleared *i, od, p* \* DART *i, od, p* DARTASONET *i, od* = DAM ASOO Cleared *i, od* \* DARTMCPC *i, od*Where:G *i, od, p* = *Total Metered Generation at all Resource Nodes* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*L *i, od, p* = *Total Adjusted Metered Load (AML) at all Load Zones* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*MAF = *Market Adjustment Factor*—Used to provide for the potential for overall price increases based on changes to ERCOT market rules or market conditions. This factor shall not be set below 100%. Revisions to this factor will be recommended by the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the ERCOT Finance and Audit (F&A) Committee, and approved by the ERCOT Board. Such revisions shall be implemented on the 45th calendar day following ERCOT Board approval unless otherwise directed by the ERCOT Board.*NUCADJ*= *Net Unit Contingent Adjustment*—To allow for situations where a generator may unintentionally or intentionally meet its requirement from the Real-Time Market (RTM)RTQQNET *i, od, p* = *Net QSE-to-QSE Energy Trades* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*RTQQES *i, od, p, c* = *QSE Energy Trades* for which the Counter-Party is the seller for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p* with Counter-Party *c*RTQQEP *i, od, p, c* = *QSE Energy Trades* for which the Counter-Party is the buyer for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p* with Counter-Party *c*DARTASONET *i, od* = *Net DAM Ancillary Service Only activities* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* DAM ASOO Cleared *i, od* = DAM Ancillary Service Only Offers Cleared in DAM for interval *i* for Operating Day *od*DARTMCPC *i, od* = Day-Ahead – Real-Time MCPC Spread for interval *i* for Operating Day *od**BTCF* = *Bilateral Trades Credit Factor*RTSPP *i, od, p* = *Real-Time Settlement Point Price* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DARTNET *i, od, p* = *Net DAM activities* for the Counter-Party for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DART *i, od, p* = *Day-Ahead - Real-Time Spread* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM EOB Cleared*i, od, p* = *DAM Energy Only Bids Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM EOO Cleared *i, od, p* = *DAM Energy Only Offers Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM TPO Cleared *i, od, p* = *DAM Three-Part Offers Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DAM PTP Cleared *i, od, p* = *DAM Point-to-Point (PTP) Obligations Cleared* for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p*DARTPTP *i, od, p* = *Day-Ahead - Real-Time Spread* for value of PTP Obligation for interval *i* for Operating Day *od* at Settlement Point *p**c* = Bilateral Counter-Party *cif = Cap Interval Factor* - Represents the historic largest percentage of System-Wide Offer Cap (SWCAP) intervals during a calendar day*e* = Most recent *n* Operating Days for which RTM Initial Settlement Statements are available*i* = Settlement Interval*n* = Days used for averaging*nm =* Notional Multiplier*od* = Operating Day*p* = A Settlement Point |

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| IMCE | $ | *Initial Minimum Current Exposure* IMCE = TOA \* (SWCAP \* *nm* \* *cif%*)  |
| TOA | None | *Trade-Only Activity*—Counter-Party that does not represent either a Load or a generation QSE. Set to “0” if Counter-Party represents a QSE that has an association with a Load Serving Entity (LSE) or a Resource Entity, or if Counter-Party does not represent any QSE;otherwise set to 1. |
| *q* | None | QSEs represented by Counter-Party. |
| *a* | None | CRR Account Holders represented by Counter-Party. |
| IA | $ | *Independent Amount*—The amount required to be posted as defined in Section 16.16.1, Counter-Party Criteria. |
| RFAF | None | *Real-Time Forward Adjustment Factor*—The adjustment factor for RTM-related forward exposure as defined in Section 16.11.4.3.3, Forward Adjustment Factors. |

The above parameters are defined as follows:

| **Parameter** | **Unit** | **Current Value\*** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *nm* | None | 50 |
| *cif* | Percentage | 9% |
| *NUCADJ* | Percentage | Minimum value of 20%. |
| *T1* | Days | 2 |
| *T2* | Days | 5 |
| *T3* | Days | 5 |
| *T4* | Days | 1 |
| *T5* | Days | For a Counter-Party that represents Load this value is equal to 5, otherwise this value is equal to 2. |
| *BTCF* | Percentage | 80% |
| *n* | Days | 14 |
| \* The current value for the parameters referenced in this table above will be recommended by TAC and approved by the ERCOT Board. ERCOT shall update parameter values on the first day of the month following ERCOT Board approval unless otherwise directed by the ERCOT Board. ERCOT shall provide a Market Notice prior to implementation of a revised parameter value. |

(3) If ERCOT, in its sole discretion, determines that the TPEA or the TPES for a Counter-Party calculated under paragraphs (1) or (2) above does not adequately match the financial risk created by that Counter-Party’s activities under these Protocols, then ERCOT may set a different TPEA or TPES for that Counter-Party. ERCOT shall, to the extent practical, give to the Counter-Party the information used to determine that different TPEA or TPES. ERCOT shall provide written or electronic Notice to the Counter-Party of the basis for ERCOT’s assessment of the Counter-Party’s financial risk and the resulting creditworthiness requirements.

(4) ERCOT shall monitor and calculate each Counter-Party’s TPEA and TPES daily.