




ERCOT Market Education

Settlements 301

Module 3: Day-Ahead Market



Products bought and sold in the DAM:



DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- Ancillary Services
- PTP Obligations

DAM Commitment

- Make-Whole

Settlement of CRRs in the DAM

Energy Offers & Bids

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Outcome #1



Charge to QSE for Awarded Energy
Bid in DAM

Outcome #2



Payment to QSE for Awarded Energy
Offer in DAM

Trigger #1



QSE5 submits an Energy Bid in the Day-Ahead Market

DAM Energy Bid is a QSE's willingness to buy energy:

- Maximum **price**
- Up to a certain **quantity**
- At a specific Settlement Point in the DAM



Trigger #1



- QSE5 submits an Energy Bid in the Day-Ahead Market
 - Bid Price = \$45/MWh
 - Quantity = 68MW for one hour
 - At Load Zone 2
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process
- **DAM prices Load Zone 2 at \$40 / MWh**



Trigger #1



- QSE5 purchased:
- 68 MW of Energy for one hour
- At Load Zone 2
- Price of \$40/MWh



Outcome #1



- Settled hourly
- Settlement calculation is:

(Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price) * (Quantity)

$$(\$40/\text{MWh}) * (68 \text{ MW}) = \$2720$$

Day-Ahead Energy Purchase Amount


$$\text{DAEPAMT}_{q,p} = \text{DASPP}_p * \text{DAEP}_{q,p}$$

Day-Ahead Energy Purchase Amount QSE Total

$$\text{DAEPAMTQSETOT}_q = \sum_p \text{DAEPAMT}_{q,p}$$

$p = A$ Settlement Point

$q = \text{QSE}$



Determinants
Day-Ahead Energy Purchase Amount
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price
Day-Ahead Energy Purchase
Day-Ahead Energy Purchase Amount QSE Total

Energy Offers & Bids

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Outcome #1



Charge to QSE for Awarded Energy Bid in DAM

Outcome #2



Payment to QSE for Awarded Energy Offer in DAM

Trigger #2



- QSE1 submits an Energy Offer in the Day-Ahead Market



- Three-Part Supply Offer
 - Startup Offer
 - Minimum Energy Offer
 - Energy Offer Curve
- DAM Energy-Only Offer

Two types of Energy Offers in Nodal Market

Trigger #2



- QSE1 submits an DAM Energy-Only Offer in the Day-Ahead Market
 - Offer Price = \$16/MWh
 - Quantity = 40 MW for one hour
 - At Resource Node 4
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process
- **DAM prices Resource Node 4 at \$16/MWh**



Trigger #2



- QSE1 sold:
- 40 MW of Energy for one hour
- At Resource Node 4
- Price of \$16/MWh



Outcome #2



- Settled hourly
- Settlement calculation is:

$$(-1) * (\text{Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price}) * (\text{Quantity})$$

$$(-1) * (\$16/\text{MWh}) * (40 \text{ MW}) = -\$640$$

Day-Ahead Energy Sale Amount


$$\text{DAESAMT}_{q,p} = (-1) * \text{DASPP}_p * \text{DAES}_{q,p}$$

Day-Ahead Energy Sale Amount QSE Total

$$\text{DAESAMTQSETOT}_q = \sum_p \text{DAESAMT}_{q,p}$$

$p = A$ Settlement Point

$q = \text{QSE}$



Determinants
Day-Ahead Energy Sale Amount
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price
Day-Ahead Energy Sale
Day-Ahead Energy Sale Amount QSE Total


Combined Cycle Train (CCT)

- A group of Combustion Turbines (CT) and Steam Turbines (ST)
- Operate in one or more configurations

Combined Cycle Generation Resource (CCGR)

- A registered configuration of a Combined Cycle Train
- Offered as a single Resource

Any or all CCGRs from a Combined Cycle Train may be offered in the Day-Ahead Market.



Settlement Point	Transaction					
	3PSO	CCGR 3PSO	DAM Energy Only Offer	DAM Energy Bid	PTP Obligation Bids	QSE to QSE Trades
Resource Node	X		X	X	X	X
CCP Logical Resource Node		X				
CCU Resource Node			X	X	X	X
Load Zone			X	X	X	X
Hub			X	X	X	X

Notes:

1. CCP = Combined Cycle Plant
2. CCU = Combined Cycle Unit
3. 3PSO = Three Part Supply Offer
4. CCGR = Combined Cycle Generation Resource



DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- Ancillary Services
- PTP Obligations

DAM Commitment

- Make-Whole

Settlement of CRRs in the DAM

Ancillary Service (AS) Plan

The required quantity in MW of each Ancillary Service for each hour of the Operating Day
ERCOT-wide

- Developed by ERCOT
- Posted to MIS Public Area by 0600



Types of Ancillary Services

- Regulation Up (Reg-Up)
- Regulation Down (Reg-Down)
- Responsive Reserve
- Non-Spin



By 0600 Day-Ahead, ERCOT posts each QSE's AS Obligation to the MIS Certified Area.



- Per QSE
- Per type of Ancillary Service (AS)
- Per hour

In the Day-Ahead Market:

QSE may Self-arrange by 1000:

- Self Supply its AS Obligation
- Trade to cover AS Obligation



QSE may Offer AS by 1000:

- Offer available capacities by AS Type
- Offers include MW and Price




ERCOT procures:

- Ancillary Services not self-arranged



Ancillary Services in the Day-Ahead Market



Outcome #1



Payment to QSE for Awarded AS Offer in DAM

Outcome #2



Charge to QSE for ERCOT procuring AS on its behalf

Trigger #1



- QSE4 offers to sell AS in the Day-Ahead Market



- Resource
- Quantity (tenths of MWs)
- Price
- Ancillary Service type
- Range of hours offered
- Expiration date and time of offer

Trigger #1



- QSE4 submits an Offer to sell Ancillary Service capacity
 - Regulation Up (Reg-Up)
 - 100 MW for at least \$4/MW
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process
- **DAM sets Day-Ahead Market Clearing Price for Capacity (Reg-up) at \$4/MW and awards QSE4's Offer**



Trigger #1



- QSE4 sold:
- 60 MW of Regulation Up (Reg-Up)
- Day-Ahead Market Clearing Price for Capacity of \$4/MW

Outcome #2



- Settled hourly
- Settlement calculation is:

$$(-1) * (\text{Price}) * (\text{Quantity})$$

$$(-1) * (\$4/\text{MW}) * (60 \text{ MW}) = -\$240$$



Regulation Up Service Payment

$$\text{PCRUA}_{MT}{}_q = (-1) * \text{MCPCRUA}_{DAM} * \text{PCRUA}_{q, DAM}$$

$$\text{\$-240}_{QSE4} = (-1) * \text{\$4/MW}_{DAM} * 60\text{MW}_{QSE4}$$

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Determinants

Procured Capacity Reg-Up Amount
 Procured Capacity Reg-Down Amount
 Procured Capacity Responsive Reserve Amount
 Procured Capacity Non-Spin Amount
 Market Clearing Price Capacity Reg-Up
 Market Clearing Price Capacity Reg-Down
 Market Clearing Price Capacity Resp. Reserve
 Market Clearing Price Capacity Non-Spin
 Procured Capacity Reg-Up
 Procured Capacity Reg-Down
 Procured Capacity Responsive Reserve
 Procured Capacity Non-Spin

DAM = Day-Ahead Market

q = QSE

Regulation Up Service Payment

$$\text{PCRUA}_{MT_q} = (-1) * \text{MCPCR}_{U_{DAM}} * \text{PCR}_{U_{q,DAM}}$$

Regulation Down Service Payment


$$\text{PCRDA}_{MT_q} = (-1) * \text{MCPCR}_{D_{DAM}} * \text{PCR}_{D_{q,DAM}}$$

Responsive Reserve Service Payment

$$\text{PCRR}_{AMT_q} = (-1) * \text{MCPCRR}_{DAM} * \text{PCRR}_{q,DAM}$$


Non-Spinning Reserve Service Payment

$$\text{PCNS}_{AMT_q} = (-1) * \text{MCPCNS}_{DAM} * \text{PCNS}_{q,DAM}$$



Determinants
Procured Capacity Reg-Up Amount
Procured Capacity Reg-Down Amount
Procured Capacity Responsive Reserve Amount
Procured Capacity Non-Spin Amount
Market Clearing Price Capacity Reg-Up
Market Clearing Price Capacity Reg-Down
Market Clearing Price Capacity Resp. Reserve
Market Clearing Price Capacity Non-Spin
Procured Capacity Reg-Up
Procured Capacity Reg-Down
Procured Capacity Responsive Reserve
Procured Capacity Non-Spin

Ancillary Services in the Day-Ahead Market



Outcome #1



Payment to QSE for Awarded AS Offer in DAM


Outcome #2



Charge to QSE for ERCOT procuring AS on its behalf

If a QSE does not self-arrange all of its AS Obligation:

- ERCOT will procure the remaining portion in DAM
- ERCOT procures AS from available AS Offers



A QSE may submit negative Self-Arranged AS Quantities:

- Limited to -500 MW for each Ancillary Service
- Limited in magnitude to net AS Trades (compliance only)



A QSE may submit negative Self-Arranged AS Quantities:

- Limited to -500 MW for each Ancillary Service
- Limited in magnitude to net AS Trades (compliance only)

Impact:

ERCOT will charge the QSE for their share of the Ancillary Service Capacities procured in DAM.

**This provision applies
only to DAM; not
allowed in SASMs.**




Trigger #2



QSE3, QSE4, & QSE5 did not Self-Arrange entire AS Obligation for Responsive Reserve Service (RRS)

QSE5 AS Obligation
(84 MW)




Trigger #2



- ERCOT needs to procure total of 116 MW of RRS
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process and procures additional AS from AS Offers

Total RRS:

- Total Quantity Needed = 116MW
- Total Quantity Procured = 128MW
- Total Cost = \$512



Trigger #2



- ERCOT needs to procure total of 116 MW of RRS
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process and procures 128 MW RRS from AS Offers

Outcome #2



- Charged per QSE
- Settlement calculation:

$$(\text{Price}) * (\text{Quantity})$$













$$(-1) * \left(\frac{\text{Total Cost of RRS}}{\text{Total RRS Needed}} \right) * \left(\text{QSE obligation not Self-Arranged} \right)$$



Outcome #2



$$(-1) * \left(\frac{\text{Total Cost of RRS}}{\text{Total RRS Needed}} \right) * \left(\text{QSE obligation not Self-Arranged} \right)$$

QSE	Price \$512 / 116 MW	Quantity Procured on behalf of QSE	Total
QSE3 			
QSE4 			
QSE5 			

Responsive Reserve Quantity

$$\text{DARRQ}_q = \text{DARRO}_q - \text{DASARRQ}_q$$



QSE3

$$14\text{MW} = 14\text{MW} - 0\text{MW}$$



QSE4

$$36\text{MW} = 52\text{MW} - 16\text{MW}$$



QSE5

$$66\text{MW} = 84\text{MW} - 18\text{MW}$$

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Determinants

Day-Ahead Resp Reserve Quantity
Day-Ahead Resp Reserve Obligation
Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Resp Reserve Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Obligation
Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Reg-Down Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Obligation
Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Reg-Up Quantity
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Quantity
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Obligation
Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Non-Spin Quantity

Responsive Reserve Quantity

$$\text{DARRQ}_q = \text{DARRO}_q - \text{DASARRQ}_q$$

Regulation Down Quantity

$$\text{DARDQ}_q = \text{DARDO}_q - \text{DASARDQ}_q$$


Regulation Up Quantity

$$\text{DARUQ}_q = \text{DARUO}_q - \text{DASARUQ}_q$$

Non-Spinning Reserve Quantity

$$\text{DANSQ}_q = \text{DANSO}_q - \text{DASANSQ}_q$$

$$q = \text{QSE}$$



Determinants
Day-Ahead Resp Reserve Quantity Day-Ahead Resp Reserve Obligation Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Resp Reserve Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Quantity Day-Ahead Reg-Down Obligation Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Reg-Down Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Quantity Day-Ahead Reg-Up Obligation Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Reg-Up Quantity
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Quantity Day-Ahead Non-Spin Obligation Day-Ahead Self-Arranged Non-Spin Quantity

Responsive Reserve Price

$$\text{DARRPR} = (-1) * \text{PCRRAMTTOT} / \text{DARRQTOT}$$

$$\$4.41/\text{MW} = (-1) * \$-512 / 116 \text{ MW}$$

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Determinants

Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Price
Procured Capacity for Responsive Reserve Amount Total
Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Quantity Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Price
Procured Capacity for Reg-Down Amount Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Quantity Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Price
Procured Capacity for Reg-Up Amount Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Quantity Total
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Price
Procured Capacity for Non-Spin Amount Total
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Quantity Total

Responsive Reserve Price

DARRPR

$$= (-1) * PCRRAMTTOT / DARRQTOT$$

Regulation Down Price

DARDPR

$$= (-1) * PCRDAMTTOT / DARDQTOT$$

Regulation Up Price

DARUPR

$$= (-1) * PCRUAMTTOT / DARUQTOT$$

Non-Spinning Reserve Price

DANSPR

$$= (-1) * PCNSAMTTOT / DANSQTOT$$

DAM

Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Determinants

Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Price
Procured Capacity for Responsive Reserve Amount Total
Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Quantity Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Price
Procured Capacity for Reg-Down Amount Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Down Quantity Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Price
Procured Capacity for Reg-Up Amount Total
Day-Ahead Reg-Up Quantity Total
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Price
Procured Capacity for Non-Spin Amount Total
Day-Ahead Non-Spin Quantity Total

Responsive Reserve Service Charge

$$\text{DARRAMT}_q = \text{DARRPR} * \text{DARRQ}_q$$

$$\$61.74_{\text{QSE3}} = \$4.41/\text{MW} * 14\text{MW}_{\text{QSE3}}$$

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

Determinants

Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Amount

Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Price

Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Quantity

Day-Ahead Reg Down Amount

Day-Ahead Reg Down Price

Day-Ahead Reg Down Quantity

Day-Ahead Reg Up Amount

Day-Ahead Reg Up Price

Day-Ahead Reg Up Quantity

Day-Ahead Non-Spinning Reserve Amount

Day-Ahead Non-Spinning Reserve Price

Day-Ahead Non-Spinning Reserve Quantity

$$q = \text{QSE}$$

Responsive Reserve Service Charge

$$\text{DARRAMT}_q = \text{DARRPR} * \text{DARRQ}_q$$

Regulation Down Service Charge

$$\text{DARDAMT}_q = \text{DARDPR} * \text{DARDQ}_q$$


Regulation Up Service Charge

$$\text{DARUAMT}_q = \text{DARUPR} * \text{DARUQ}_q$$

Non-Spinning Reserve Service Charge

$$\text{DANSAMT}_q = \text{DANSPR} * \text{DANSQ}_q$$

$$q = \text{QSE}$$



Determinants
Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Amount Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Price Day-Ahead Responsive Reserve Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg Down Amount Day-Ahead Reg Down Price Day-Ahead Reg Down Quantity
Day-Ahead Reg Up Amount Day-Ahead Reg Up Price Day-Ahead Reg Up Quantity
Day-Ahead Non-Spinning Reserve Amount Day-Ahead Non-Spinning Reserve Price Day-Ahead Non-Spinning Reserve Quantity

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- Ancillary Services
- PTP Obligations

DAM Commitment

- Make-Whole

Settlement of CRRs in the DAM

PTP Obligations Acquired in the Day-Ahead Market

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations


Outcome #1



Charge to QSE for Awarded PTP
Obligation Bid in DAM

Day-Ahead Market PTP Obligations

- Hedge against congestion costs in Real-Time
- Charge or payment when Grid is congested in Real-Time



	PTP Obligation (CRR)	DAM PTP Obligation
How acquired:	Auction / Allocation	DAM
Who Purchases:	CRR Account Holder	QSE
Tradable:	Yes	No
How Purchased:	TOU Blocks	Hourly
Initial Investment:	Auction clearing price	Day-Ahead SPPs (Sink – Source)*
Target Payout:	Day-Ahead SPPs (Sink – Source)	Real-Time SPPs (Sink – Source)

** Other DAM charges may apply*

Trigger #1



- QSE3 Bids to buy a PTP Obligation in the DAM



- Source and Sink of PTP Obligation
- Not-to-Exceed Price (\$ / MW / hr)
- Quantity (MW)
- Range of hours

Trigger #1




- QSE3 Bids to buy a PTP Obligation in the DAM
- Not-to-Exceed Price = \$26/MWh
- Quantity = 10 MW
- Source Resource Node 4 (RN4)
- Sink Load Zone 2 (LZ2)
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process



Trigger #1



- QSE3 Bids to buy a PTP Obligation in the DAM
 - Not-to-Exceed Price = \$26/MWh
 - Quantity = 10 MW
 - Source is Resource Node 4 (RN4)
 - Sink is Load Zone 2 (LZ2)
- ERCOT executes the DAM Clearing Process



PTP Obligation Price is \$24/MWh
ERCOT awards QSE3 its PTP Obligation Bid

Trigger #1



QSE3 purchased:

- 10 MW of PTP Obligation
- Source Resource Node 4 (RN4)
- Sink Load Zone 2 (LZ2)
- Price of \$24/MWh



Outcome #1



- Settled hourly
- Settlement calculation is:

$$\frac{(\text{Price}) * (\text{Quantity})}{(\text{SPP at Sink} - \text{SPP at Source}) * (\text{Quantity})}$$
$$(\$24/\text{MWh}) * (10 \text{ MW}) = \$240$$

Settlement for PTP Obligations Acquired in the DAM



$$\text{DARTOBLAMT}_{q, (j, k)} = \text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)} * \text{RTOBL}_{q, (j, k)}$$

$$\text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)} = \text{DASPP}_k - \text{DASPP}_j$$

$q = \text{QSE}$


$j = \text{Source Settlement Point}$

$k = \text{Sink Settlement Point}$


Determinants
Day-Ahead Real-Time Obligation Amount
Day-Ahead Obligation Price
Real-Time Obligation
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price

Special Product for NOIEs

- A NOIE (or their QSE) can buy PTP Obligations linked to PTP Options they own.
- Cash out PTP Options in DAM
- Buy like quantity of DAM PTP Obligations
- No charge in Real-time if price spread is negative



Settlement for DAM PTP Obligations with Links to Options



$$\text{DARTOBLLOAMT}_{q, (j, k)} = \text{Max} (0, \text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)}) * \text{RTOBLLO}_{q, (j, k)}$$

$$\text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)} = \text{DASPP}_k - \text{DASPP}_j$$

$q = \text{QSE}$
 $j = \text{Source Settlement Point}$
 $k = \text{Sink Settlement Point}$

Determinants
Day-Ahead Real-Time Obligation with Links to an Option Amount
Day-Ahead Obligation Price
Real-Time Obligation with Links to an Option
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price

DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- Ancillary Services
- PTP Obligations

DAM Commitment

- Make-Whole

Settlement of CRRs in the DAM

Outcome #1



Make-Whole Payment to DAM-Committed QSE with a Three-Part Supply Offer


What:

A payment to ensure generation costs are met when Resource is DAM-committed


Why:

Guarantees that a DAM-committed Resource with a Three-Part Supply Offer recovers its allowable cost to Start-Up and its operating energy costs

Calculating the Day-Ahead Make-Whole Payment




Calculating the Day-Ahead Make-Whole Payment




Calculating the Day-Ahead Make-Whole Payment

Day-Ahead Market Sales =


$$\text{DAM Energy Sales} * \text{SPP} + \text{AS Sales} * \text{MCPC}$$




What if revenues are less than costs?



What if revenues are less than costs?



What if revenues are less than costs?



Trigger #1



$$\left(\begin{array}{c} \text{DAM} \\ \text{Revenues} \end{array} \right) < \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{DAM Guaranteed} \\ \text{Amount} \end{array} \right)$$

A QSE will receive a Make-Whole Payment if its revenues from the DAM are less than the Startup, Minimum Energy, and Operating costs

Trigger #1



(DAM Revenues)



(DAM Guaranteed Amount)

QSE To Do

- ☒ Submit Three-Part Supply Offer in DAM
- ☒ QSE is DAM-Committed
- ☒ Runs DAM-Committed Resource in Real-Time


ERCOT To Do

- ☐ Calculate DAM Guaranteed Costs
 - ☐ Use appropriate values for start up and minimum energy
 - ☐ Calculate Day-Ahead AIEC
- ☐ Calculate DAM Revenues
 - ☐ Calculate Revenues from Energy
 - ☐ Calculate Revenues from AS


Calculate DAM Guaranteed Costs

$$\text{DAM Guaranteed Costs} = \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Startup costs} \\ + \\ \text{Minimum energy costs} \\ + \\ \text{Incremental Energy Costs} \end{array} \right)$$

Startup Offer



Minimum-Energy Offer




Energy Offer Curve



Calculate DAM Guaranteed Costs

$$\text{DAM Guaranteed Costs} = \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Startup costs} \\ + \\ \text{Minimum energy costs} \\ + \\ \text{Incremental Energy Costs} \end{array} \right)$$

Minimum-Energy Offer




Energy Offer Curve



- Minimum Energy Offer (MEO)
- Low Sustained Limit (LSL)


Startup and Minimum Energy costs subject to caps



If ERCOT has Verifiable Costs

Startup Cap = Verifiable Startup Costs

Minimum Energy Cap = Verifiable Minimum-Energy Costs



Otherwise

Startup Cap = Resource Category Startup Offer Generic Cap

Minimum Energy Cap = Resource Category Minimum-Energy Generic Cap




Calculate DAM Guaranteed Costs

$$\text{DAM Guaranteed Costs} = \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{Startup costs} \\ + \\ \text{Minimum energy costs} \\ + \\ \text{Incremental Energy Costs} \end{array} \right)$$

- Day-Ahead Average Incremental Energy Cost (DAAIEC)


Calculate DAM Guaranteed Costs

Calculate Average Incremental Energy Cost (AIEC)



Calculates the additional cost for a Generation Resource to produce energy above its LSL


Average Incremental Energy Cost (AIEC)



- LSL is the minimum sustained energy production
- DAESR is amount of energy that was cleared in the DAM


Determinants
L ow S ustained L imit D ay- A head E nergy S ale from R esource

Average Incremental Energy Cost (AIEC)



The area under the curve divided by the energy cleared above LSL gives the average cost per MWh for that energy.


Average Incremental Energy Cost (AIEC)



For calculating Make-Whole, the curve is capped by the Day-Ahead Energy Offer Curve Price Cap (DAEOCPRCAP)

The cap is defined in the Protocols by technology type.


Average Incremental Energy Cost (AIEC)



$$\text{AIEC} = \frac{\text{Area under curve}}{(\text{DAESR} - \text{LSL})}$$

Average cost for supplying energy from the LSL to the DAESR for the hour

Average Incremental Energy Cost (AIEC)





QSE1's Resource is committed for 4 hours

- Awarded 50 MW per hour
- Low Sustained Limit is 10MW
- From Three-Part Supply Offer
 - Startup Offer = \$5000
 - Minimum Energy Offer = \$10/MWh
 - AIEC = \$20/MWh
- Startup Cap = \$4,400
- Minimum Energy Cap = \$12/MWh





$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DAMGCOST}_{q,p,r} = & \text{Min}(\text{DASUO}_{q,p,r}, \text{DASUCAP}_{q,p,r}) \\
 & + \sum (\text{Min}(\text{DAMEO}_{q,p,r,h}, \text{DAMECAP}_{q,p,r,h}) * \text{DALSL}_{q,p,r,h}) \\
 & + \sum (\text{DAAIEC}_{q,p,r,h} * (\text{DAESR}_{q,p,r,h} - \text{DALSL}_{q,p,r,h}))
 \end{aligned}$$


Startup Offer (**DASUO**) and Cap (**DASUCAP**)

Minimum Energy Offer (**DAMEO**) and Cap (**DAMECAP**)

Low Sustained Limit (**DALSL**)

Day-Ahead AIEC (**DAAIEC**)

Day-Ahead Energy Sales (**DAESR**)





$$\begin{aligned} \text{DAMGCOST} = & \text{Min} (\text{DASUO}, \text{DASUCAP}) \\ & + \sum (\text{Min} (\text{DAMEO}, \text{DAMECAP}) * \text{DALSL}) \\ & + \sum (\text{DAAIEC} * (\text{DAESR} - \text{DALSL})) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DAMGCOST} = & \text{Min} (\$5000, \$4400) \\ & + (\text{Min} (\$10/\text{MWh}, \$12/\text{MWh}) * 10\text{MW}) * 4\text{h} \\ & + (\$20/\text{MWh} * (50\text{MW} - 10\text{MW})) * 4\text{h} \\ = & \$4400 + \$400 + \$3200 \\ = & \$8000 \end{aligned}$$

Trigger #1



DAMGCOST $q, p, r = M$

$+ \sum$

$+ \sum$

Startup Offer (DA

Minimum Energy

Low Sustained

Day-Ahead AIEC

Day-Ahead Energy Sales (DAESR)

ERCOT To Do



Calculate DAM
Guaranteed Costs



Use appropriate values
for start up and
minimum energy



Calculate Day-Ahead AIEC



Calculate DAM
Revenues



Calculate Revenues
from Energy





Calculate Revenues
from AS

(DAM Guaranteed
Amount

$(, r, h) * DALSL_{q, p, r, h}$

$DALSL_{q, p, r, h}$








Energy Revenues for Hour 1

$$\text{Revenues} = (-1) * (\text{Price}) * (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{DAEREV} &= (-1) * \text{DASPP} * \text{DAESR} \\ &= (-1) * \$30/\text{MWh} * 50 \text{ MW} \\ &= -\$1500\end{aligned}$$



Ancillary Services Revenues for Hour 1

$$\text{Revenues} = (-1) * (\text{Price}) * (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\text{DAASREV}_{q, r, h} =$$

$$\begin{aligned} &((-1) * \text{MCPCRUCR}_{\text{DAM}, h} * \text{PCRUR}_{r, q, \text{DAM}, h}) \\ &+ ((-1) * \text{MCPCRDR}_{\text{DAM}, h} * \text{PCRDR}_{r, q, \text{DAM}, h}) \\ &+ ((-1) * \text{MCPCRRR}_{\text{DAM}, h} * \text{PCRRR}_{r, q, \text{DAM}, h}) \\ &+ ((-1) * \text{MCPCNSR}_{\text{DAM}, h} * \text{PCNSR}_{r, q, \text{DAM}, h}) \end{aligned}$$

$$-\$180_{q, r, h} =$$

$$\begin{aligned} &((-1) * \$5/\text{MW} * 10 \text{ MW}) \\ &+ ((-1) * \$5/\text{MW} * 10 \text{ MW}) \\ &+ ((-1) * \$10/\text{MW} * 5 \text{ MW}) \\ &+ ((-1) * \$15/\text{MW} * 2 \text{ MW}) \end{aligned}$$

**Trigger
#1**



$$(\$7000) < (\$8000)$$

DAM Revenues = DAEREV + DAASREV

	DAEREV	DAASREV
Hour 1	-\$1500	-\$180
Hour 2	-\$1500	-\$220
Hour 3	-\$1500	-\$250
Hour 4	-\$1500	-\$350
Total for Commitment	-\$6000	-\$1000



**Trigger
#1**



DAM Rev

ERCOT To Do

☒ Calculate DAM
Guaranteed Costs

☒ Use appropriate values
for start up and
minimum energy

☒ Calculate Day-Ahead AIEC


☒ Calculate DAM
Revenues

☒ Calculate Revenues
from Energy

☒ Calculate Revenues
from AS

\$8000

Hour 1		
Hour 2		
Hour 3		
Hour 4		
Total for Commitment	-\$6000	000



Trigger #1



$$(\$7000) < (\$8000)$$

Outcome #1



- DAM Revenues are less than DAM Guaranteed Costs for QSE1 unit 5
- QSE1 eligible for DAM Make-Whole Payment



**Trigger
#1**



\$7000



\$8000

**Outcome
#1**



DAM Make-Whole Payment for each hour



DAMWAMT_{q, p, r, h} =

$$(-1) * \text{Max} (0, \text{DAMGCOST}_{q, p, r} + \sum \text{DAEREV}_{q, p, r, h} + \sum \text{DAASREV}_{q, r, h}) \\ * (\text{DAESR}_{q, p, r, h} / \sum \text{DAESR}_{q, p, r, h})$$

**Trigger
#1**




$$(\$7000) < (\$8000)$$

**Outcome
#1**



DAM Make-Whole Payment for each hour




$$\begin{aligned} \text{DAMWAMT} &= (-1) * \text{Max} (0, \$8000 + \$-6000 + \$-1000) \\ &\quad * 50 \text{ MW} / (200 \text{ MW}) \\ &= (-1) * \text{Max} (0, \$1000) * 0.25 = -\$250 \end{aligned}$$

What if the DAM-committed Resource is part of a Combined Cycle Plant?

- Make-Whole is paid at the Train level
- DAM Guaranteed Amount
 - Start-up Costs
 - Minimum and Incremental Energy Costs
 - May include Transition Costs

DAM may start any offered CCGR and transition from one offered CCGR to another





$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DAMGCOST}_{q,p,r} = & \text{Min}(\text{DASUO}_{q,p,r}, \text{DASUCAP}_{q,p,r}) + \text{Transition Cost} \\
 & + \sum (\text{Min}(\text{DAMEO}_{q,p,r,h}, \text{DAMECAP}_{q,p,r,h}) * \text{DALSL}_{q,p,r,h}) \\
 & + \sum (\text{DAAIEC}_{q,p,r,h} * (\text{DAESR}_{q,p,r,h} - \text{DALSL}_{q,p,r,h}))
 \end{aligned}$$

Startup Offer (**DASUO**) and Cap (**DASUCAP**)

Minimum Energy Offer (**DAMEO**) and Cap (**DAMECAP**)

Low Sustained Limit (**DALSL**)

Day-Ahead AIEC (**DAAIEC**)

Day-Ahead Energy Sales (**DAESR**)





$$\text{Transition Cost} = \text{Max}(0, \text{Min}(\text{DASUO}_{\text{afterCCGR}}, \text{DASUCAP}_{\text{afterCCGR}}) - \text{Min}(\text{DASUO}_{\text{beforeCCGR}}, \text{DASUCAP}_{\text{beforeCCGR}}))$$

afterCCGR: The CCGR to which a Combined Cycle Train transitions

beforeCCGR: The CCGR from which a Combined Cycle Train transitions

Refer to your Settlements Workbook

In a small group, respond to the questions that relate to Scenario #DAM1.

You have 5 – 10 minutes to complete your questions.



*If you cannot complete all questions, don't worry
– all questions will be reviewed as a class.*



DAM




Participation in DAM

- Energy
- Ancillary Services
- PTP Obligations

DAM Commitment

- Make-Whole

Settlement of CRRs in the DAM



Outcome #1



Make-Whole Charge to a QSE with one or more cleared DAM Energy Bids and/or PTP Obligation Bids

What:

Charge to collect all funds needed for the Make-Whole Payment

Why:

Keep ERCOT revenue neutral

$$\left(\text{Total DAM Make-Whole Payments ERCOT-Wide} \right) * \left(\text{DAM Energy Purchase Ratio Share} \right)$$

Where...



$$\begin{aligned} &\text{DAM Energy Purchase Ratio Share} \\ &= \\ &\left(\frac{\text{A QSE's DAM Energy Purchase}}{\text{Total DAM Energy Purchases ERCOT - Wide}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Trigger #1



- QSE3 has a cleared Energy Bid from DAM
- Purchased 50 MW in the DAM
- ERCOT-Wide total energy purchases in the DAM:
 - 500 MW

Outcome #1



$$\text{Make-Whole Charge} = (-1) * \left(\frac{\text{Total DAM Make-Whole Payments}}{\text{Total DAM Energy Purchases}} \right) * \left(\frac{\text{QSE's DAM Energy Purchase}}{\text{Total DAM Energy Purchases}} \right)$$

Trigger #1



- QSE3 has a cleared Energy Bid from DAM
- Purchased 50 MW in the DAM
- ERCOT-Wide total energy purchases in the DAM:
 - 500 MW

Outcome #1



$$\text{Make-Whole Charge} = (-1) * (-\$250) * 50\text{MW} / 500\text{MW} = (-1) * (-\$250) * .10 = \$25$$


$$\text{Make-Whole Charge} = (-1) * \left(\frac{\text{Total DAM Make-Whole Payments}}{\text{Total DAM Energy Purchases}} \right) * \left(\frac{\text{QSE's DAM Energy Purchase}}{\text{Total DAM Energy Purchases}} \right)$$

$$\text{LADAMWAMT}_q = (-1) * \text{DAMWAMTTOT} * \text{DAERS}_q$$



$q = \text{QSE}$


Determinants
Load A llocated D ay- A head M ake- W hole A mount
D ay- A head M ake- W hole A mount T otal
D ay- A head E nergy Purchase R atio S hare



CRR owners may be paid according to their “target” payment.

Or their payments may be reduced:



- Derations
- CRR Shortfall Charges



Target Payment

CRRs will be settled at the Target Payment when not derated



$$\text{Target Payment} = \text{Price} * \text{Quantity}$$



Deration of CRRs


Due to oversold transmission elements, a CRR payment may be derated:

- If sink is a Resource Node
- If the Target Payment is a positive value.




Deration of CRRs

Deration is based on impact of Resource Node on constraints



Derivation of CRRs



Day-Ahead Network Operations Model

- Developed from the Network Model

- Developed daily
- Reflects forecasted transmission system for the next day
- Updated with scheduled outages and forecasted system conditions

Derivation of CRRs

During Day-Ahead Market



**Day-Ahead
Network
Operations
Model**


- Developed from the Network Model




**Day-Ahead
Simultaneous
Feasibility Test**

- Executed daily
- Verifies feasibility of CRRs sold in Auction

Derivation of CRRs




Derated Payment




$$(-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{c} (\text{Target Payment} - \text{Derated Amount}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\text{Target Payment or Hedge Value}) \end{array} \right)$$

Derated Payment and Hedge Value

- Derating CRRs Reduces Gaming Opportunity
- Hedge Value maintains value of CRR as Hedge
 - Maximum Resource Price when Resource Node is Sink
 - Minimum Resource Price when Resource Node is Source



Hedge Value




Hedge Value Price

$$\text{HV PRICE}_{(j, k)} = \text{Max} (0, \text{MAXRESPR}_k - \text{DASPP}_j)$$

RESOURCE TYPE	MAXRESPR _k	MINRESPR _j
Nuclear	\$15/MWh	-\$20/MWh
Simple Cycle > 90MW	FIP*14	FIP*10
Combined Cycle > 90MW	FIP*9	FIP*5
Wind	\$0	-\$35/MWh
PhotoVoltaic (Solar)	\$0	-\$10/MWh

Hedge Value




Hedge Value Price

$$\text{HV PRICE}_{(j, k)} = \text{Max} (0, \text{MAXRESPR}_k - \text{MINRESPR}_j)$$

RESOURCE TYPE	MAXRESPR _k	MINRESPR _j
Nuclear	\$15/MWh	-\$20/MWh
Simple Cycle > 90MW	FIP*14	FIP*10
Combined Cycle > 90MW	FIP*9	FIP*5
Wind	\$0	-\$35/MWh
PhotoVoltaic (Solar)	\$0	-\$10/MWh

CRRs Settled in the DAM



Outcome #1



Payment or Charge to CRRAHs for PTP Obligations settled in the DAM

Outcome #2




Payment to CRRAHs for PTP Options settled in the DAM

Trigger #1



CRRAH5 owns a PTP Obligation that settles in the Day-Ahead Market



Target Payment for PTP Obligations

$$\text{DAOBLTP}_{o, (j, k)} = \text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)} (\text{Price}) * \text{DAOBL}_{o, (j, k)} (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)} = \text{DASPP}_k - \text{DASPP}_j$$

j = Source Settlement Point

k = Sink Settlement Point

o = CRR Owner

Determinants


Day-Ahead Obligation
Target Payment

Day-Ahead Obligation Price

Day-Ahead Obligation
Quantity

Day-Ahead Settlement Point
Price

Target Payment



Determinants
Day-Ahead Obligation Amount
Day-Ahead Obligation Target Payment

j = Source Settlement Point

k = Sink Settlement Point

o = CRR Owner

When either

- Sink is not a Resource Node, or
- Target Payment is less than zero

$$\text{DAOBLAMT}_{o, (j, k)} = (-1) * \text{DAOBLTP}_{o, (j, k)}$$

Trigger #1





- CRRAH5 owns a PTP Obligation that settles in the Day-Ahead Market
 - Quantity: 10 MW
 - Source: Hub 2
 - \$20/MWh
 - Sink: Resource Node 4
 - \$30/MWh
 - Price: \$10/MWh

$$\text{Target Payment} = \text{Price} * \text{Quantity}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Target Payment} &= \$10/\text{MWh} * 10 \text{ MW} \\ &= \$100 \text{ per hour}\end{aligned}$$

When Sink is a Resource Node & Target Payment is greater than zero



$$(-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{l} (\text{Target Payment} - \text{Derated Amount}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\text{Target Payment or Hedge Value}) \end{array} \right)$$

Derated Amount of PTP Obligations

$$\text{DAOBLDA}_{o, (j, k)} = \text{OBLDRPR}_{(j, k)} (\text{Price}) * \text{DAOBL}_{o, (j, k)} (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\text{OBLDRPR}_{(j, k)} = \sum_c (\text{Max} (0, \text{DAWASF}_{j, c} - \text{DAWASF}_{k, c}) * \text{DASP}_c * \text{DRF}_c)$$

j = Source Settlement Point

k = Sink Settlement Point

o = CRR Owner

c = A constraint

Determinants

Day-Ahead Obligation
Derated Amount

Obligation Deration Price

Day-Ahead Obligation
Quantity

Day-Ahead Weighted
Average Shift Factor

Day-Ahead Shadow Price

Deration Factor

Derated Amount of PTP Obligations

$$\text{DAOBLDA}_{o, (j, k)} = \text{OBLDRPR}_{(j, k)} (\text{Price}) * \text{DAOBL}_{o, (j, k)} (\text{Quantity})$$

OBLDRPR = \$0.75/MW per hour

DAOBLDA = **OBLDRPR** * **DAOBL**

= \$0.75/MW * **10 MW**

= **\$7.50**

Determinants

Day-Ahead Obligation
Derated Amount

Obligation Deration Price

Day-Ahead Obligation
Quantity

Day-Ahead Weighted
Average Shift Factor

Day-Ahead Shadow Price

Deration Factor

Hedge Value for PTP Obligations

$$\text{DAOBLHV}_{o, (j, k)} = \text{DAOBLHVPR}_{(j, k)} (\text{Price}) * \text{DAOBL}_{o, (j, k)} (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\text{DAOBLHVPR}_{(j, k)} = \text{Max} (0, \text{MAXRESPR}_k - \text{DASPP}_j)$$

Determinants
Day-Ahead Obligation Hedge Value
Day-Ahead Obligation Hedge Value Price
Day-Ahead Obligation Quantity
Maximum Resource Price
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price



Hedge Value for PTP Obligations

$$\text{DAOBLHV}_{o, (j, k)} = \text{DAOBLHVPR}_{(j, k)} (\text{Price}) * \text{DAOBL}_{o, (j, k)} (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DAOBLHVPR} &= \text{Max} (0, \$36 - \$20) \\ &= \$16/\text{MWh} \end{aligned}$$

Resource is Combined Cycle > 90MW

FIP = \$4


Determinants
Day-Ahead Obligation Hedge Value
Day-Ahead Obligation Hedge Value Price
Day-Ahead Obligation Quantity
Maximum Resource Price
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price

Hedge Value for PTP Obligations


$$\text{DAOBLHV}_{o, (j, k)} = \text{DAOBLHVPR}_{(j, k)} (\text{Price}) * \text{DAOBL}_{o, (j, k)} (\text{Quantity})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{DAOBLHV} &= \text{DAOBLHVPR} * \text{DAOBL} \\ &= \$16/\text{MWh} * 10 \text{ MW} \\ &= \$160 \text{ per hour} \end{aligned}$$

Determinants
Day-Ahead Obligation Hedge Value
Day-Ahead Obligation Hedge Value Price
Day-Ahead Obligation Quantity
Day-Ahead Settlement Point Price
Minimum Resource Price




$$\text{DAOBLAMT} = (-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{c} (\text{Target Payment} - \text{Derated Amount}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\text{Target Payment or Hedge Value}) \end{array} \right)$$




$$\text{DAOBLAMT} = (-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{c} (\text{DAOBLTP}_{o, (j, k)} - \text{DAOBLDA}_{o, (j, k)}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\text{DAOBLTP}_{o, (j, k)} \text{ or } \text{DAOBLHV}_{o, (j, k)}) \end{array} \right)$$

Outcome #1



$$\text{DAOBLAMT} = (-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{c} (\$100 - \$7.50) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\$100 \text{ or } \$160) \end{array} \right) = -\$100$$

CRRs Settled in the DAM



Outcome #1



Payment or Charge to CRRAHs for
PTP Obligations settled in the DAM

Outcome #2




Payment to CRRAHs for PTP Options
settled in the DAM


Trigger #2



CRRAH5 also owns a PTP Option that settles in the Day-Ahead Market



Target Payment



Determinants
Day-Ahead Option Amount Day-Ahead Option Target Payment

j = Source Settlement Point

k = Sink Settlement Point

o = CRR Owner


When sink is not a Resource Node

$$\mathbf{DAOPTAMT}_{o, (j, k)} = (-1) * \mathbf{DAOPTTP}_{o, (j, k)}$$

Trigger #2





- CRRAH5 owns a PTP Option that settles in the Day-Ahead Market
 - Quantity: 10 MW
 - Source: Resource Node 1
 - \$10/MWh
 - Sink: Resource Node 3
 - \$30/MWh
 - Price: \$20/MWh



$$\text{Target Payment} = \text{Price} * \text{Quantity}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Target Payment} &= \$20/\text{MWh} * 10 \text{ MW} \\ &= \$200 \text{ per hour}\end{aligned}$$

When Sink is a Resource Node & Target Payment is not zero



$$(-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{l} (\text{Target Payment} - \text{Derated Amount}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\text{Target Payment or Hedge Value}) \end{array} \right)$$

Outcome #2



$$\text{DAOPTTP}_{o, (j, k)} = \$200$$

$$\text{DAOPTDA}_{o, (j, k)} = \$25$$

$$\text{DAOPTHV}_{o, (j, k)} = \$150$$


Determinants

Day-Ahead Option Target Payment


Day-Ahead Option Derated Amount

Day-Ahead Option Hedge Value

$$\text{DAOPTAMT} = (-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{l} (\text{Target Payment} - \text{Derated Amount}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min (Target Payment or Hedge Value)} \end{array} \right)$$



$$\text{DAOPTAMT} = (-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{c} (\text{DAOPTTP}_{o, (j, k)} - \text{DAOPTDA}_{o, (j, k)}) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\text{DAOPTTP}_{o, (j, k)} \text{ or } \text{DAOPTHV}_{o, (j, k)}) \end{array} \right)$$



$$\text{DAOPTAMT} = (-1) * \text{Max} \left(\begin{array}{c} (\$200 - \$25) \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Min} (\$200 \text{ or } \$150) \end{array} \right) = -\$175$$

Refer to your Settlements Workbook

In a small group, respond to the questions that relate to Scenario #DAM2.


You have 5 – 10 minutes to complete your questions.



*If you cannot complete all questions, don't worry
– all questions will be reviewed as a class.*



PCRRs Settled in the DAM



Outcome #1



Payment or Charge to CRRAHs for settled PTP Obligations with Refund

Outcome #2



Payment to CRRAHs for settled PTP Options with Refund



DAM

Settlement of
CRRs in the DAM

The Quantity depends on the Resource output in Real-Time

Price	Quantity (Lesser of)
DAM PCRR Price between Source and Sink	PCRR Quantity Held by the NOIE
	Output Schedule of the Resource

ERCOT uses time-weighted generation, if there is not an Output Schedule.

**DAM**Settlement of
CRRs in the DAM**For Example**

Price	Obligation Quantity (Lesser of)	
\$50/MWh	100 MW	PTP Obligation Quantity Held by the NOIE
	90 MW	Resource Real-Time Output based on its Output Schedules
PTP Obligation w/Refund Payment		$\$50/\text{MWh} \times 90\text{MW} = \$4500/\text{h}$

Target Payment for PTP Obligations with Refund

$$\text{DAOBLRAMT}_{o, (j, k)} = (-1) * \text{DAOBLPR}_{(j, k)} * \text{Min} (\text{DAOBLR}_{o, (j, k)}, \text{OBLRACT}_{o, (j, k)})$$

Quantity = Lesser of
(Obligations held or Actual Obligations used)

j = Source Settlement Point
k = Sink Settlement Point
o = CRR Owner

Determinants
Day-Ahead Obligation with Refund Amount
Day-Ahead Obligation Price
Day-Ahead Obligation with Refund Quantity
Obligation with Refund Actual Usage

Target Payment for PTP Options with Refund

$$\text{DAOPTRAMT}_{o, (j, k)} = (-1) * \text{DAOPTPR}_{(j, k)} * \text{Min}(\text{OPTR}_{o, (j, k)}, \text{OPTRACT}_{o, (j, k)})$$

Quantity = Lesser of
(Options held or Actual Options used)

j = Source Settlement Point
 k = Sink Settlement Point
 o = CRR Owner

Determinants
Day-Ahead Option with Refund Amount
Day-Ahead Option Price
Option with Refund Quantity
Option with Refund Actual Usage

Outcome #1



Charge to CRR AHs when there are insufficient funds to settle CRRs in the DAM

What:

Charge to CRR Account Holders based on a Credit Share Ratio

Why:

Congestion Rent collected in the DAM may not be adequate to pay the amount due to CRR Owners in the DAM

Target Payment of CRRs Settled in the Day-Ahead

Occurs hourly



- Charges for Cleared DAM Energy Bids
- Charges for Cleared DAM PTP Obligation Bids



- Payments for Cleared DAM Energy Offers
- Payments for Cleared DAM PTP Obligation Bids



Payment due to CRR
Account Holders
(Target Payment)



Trigger #1



- Insufficient funds collected to pay CRR Account Holders

Outcome #1



Payment due to CRR Account Holders
(Target Payment)



$$\text{Day-Ahead Shortfall Charge} = \left(\text{Total CRR Shortfall} \right) * \left(\frac{\text{CRR Owner Target Payment}}{\text{Total CRR Target Payments for hour}} \right)$$

$$\text{Day-Ahead Shortfall Charge} = \left(\text{Total CRR Shortfall} \right) * \left(\text{CRR Owner Target Payment} / \text{Total CRR Target Payments for hour} \right)$$

Hour Ending 1300	
Total CRR Target Payment	\$20 Million
Congestion Rent Collected	\$19 Million
CRR Shortfall for the hour	?
CRR Owner's Target Payment	\$2 Million
CRR Owner's Credit Ratio Share	?
CRR Owner's Shortfall Charge	?



Day-Ahead CRR Shortfall Amount

$$\text{DACRRSAMT}_o = \text{DACRRSAMTTOT} * \text{CRRCRRSDA}_o$$

$$\text{DACRRSAMTTOT} = (-1) * \text{Min} (0, (\text{DACONGRENT} + \text{DACRRCRTOT} + \text{DACRRCHTOT}))$$

Payment due to CRR Account Holders
(Target Payment)

o = CRR Owner

Determinants
Day- A head CRR S hort A mount
Day- A head CRR S hort A mount T otal
CRR Credit Ratio S hare Day-Ahead

Day-Ahead Congestion Rent

$$\text{DACONGRENT} = \text{DAESAMTTOT} + \text{DAEPAMTTOT} \\ + \text{DARTOBLAMTTOT} + \text{DARTOBLLOAMTTOT}$$



DACONGRENT	
DAESAMTTOT	Day-Ahead Energy Sale Amount Total
DAEPAMTTOT	Day-Ahead Energy Purchase Amount Total
DARTOBLAMTTOT	Day-Ahead Real-Time Obligation Amount Total
DARTOBLLOAMTTOT	Day-Ahead Real-Time Obligation with Links to an Option Amount Total

Payment due to CRR Account Holders (Target Payment)



$$\frac{\text{Charges} + \text{Payments}}{\text{DACRRCHTOT} + \text{DACRRCRTOT}}$$

DACRRCHTOT	
DAOBLCHTOT	Day-Ahead Obligation Charge Total
DAOBLRCHTOT	Day-Ahead Obligation with Refund Charge Total

DACRRCRTOT	
DAOBLCRTOT	Day-Ahead Obligation Credit Total
DAOBLRCRTOT	Day-Ahead Obligation with Refund Credit Total
DAOPTAMTTOT	Day-Ahead Option Amount Total
DAOPTRAMTTOT	Day-Ahead Option with Refund Amount Total

Day-Ahead CRR Shortfall Amount

$$\text{DACRRSAMT}_o = \text{DACRRSAMTTOT} * \text{CRRCRRSDA}_o$$

$$\text{CRRCRRSDA}_o = \left(\frac{\text{Target Payment per CRR Owner}}{\text{Total CRR Payments for hour}} \right)$$

$o = \text{CRR Owner}$

Determinants
Day-Ahead CRR Short Amount
Day-Ahead CRR Short Amount Total
CRR Credit Ratio Share Day-Ahead

CRR Credit Ratio Share (Day-Ahead)

$$\text{CRRCRRSDA}_o = \left(\frac{\text{Target Payment per CRR Owner}}{\text{Total CRR Payments for hour}} \right)$$

Target Payment per CRR Owner	
DAOBLCROTOT	Day-Ahead Obligation Credit Total
DAOBLRCROTOT	Day-Ahead Obligation with Refund Credit Total
DAOPTAMTOTOT	Day-Ahead Option Amount Total
DAOPTRAMTOTOT	Day-Ahead Option with Refund Amount Total

Total CRR Payments	
DACRRCRTOT	Day-Ahead CRR Credit Total

CRR Auction



Charges & Payments for CRRs



Revenue Distribution

CRR Balancing Account

Reconcile CRR Short payments



DAM



Participation in DAM

- Energy
- AS
- PTP Obligations

DAM Commitment

- Make-Whole

Settlement of CRRs purchased in the Auction

RUC

Commitment

- Make-Whole
- Clawback



Decommitment

Real-Time

Real-Time Activities

- Imbalances
- Base Point Deviations
- Other odds & ends

Settlement of PTP Obligations purchased in the DAM



Real Time Ancillary Service Settlements

Revenue Neutrality