

NPRR 463 CRR Auction Structure Enhancements

Congestion Management Working Group

Tuesday, May 8, 2012



Long Term Auction Sequence delivers benefits due to increase auctioning

Long-Term Auction Sequence Structure

-Benefits of proposed auction structure-

- Increased Liquidity
 - Each month is auctioned five times (including monthly auction)
 - Increased opportunity to acquire new hedges and reconfigure existing holdings
- More frequent price discovery
 - Sets the stage for more efficient CRR credit methodology
- Reductions in credit posting peaks, i.e. only six months locked at a time



Long Term Auction Sequence delivers benefits due to increase auctioning

Long-Term Auction Sequence Structure

-Overview of NPRR 463-

- Two "Long-Term Auction Sequences" held in the spring and fall replace today's annual CRR Auction
 - Each Long-Term Auction Sequence contains four successive six-month auctions, i.e. 24 months
 - Each sequence rolls-in a new six-months and rolls-out the oldest six-months
- Initially, each sequence is approximately 12 weeks in duration.
 - Goal is to reduce duration as operational experience and/or system improvements are acquired.
- CRR products are purchased in single month or consecutive month strips
 - Benefits of monthly shaping retained
 - Simplifies baseloading of 2013 open positions

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Preconditions: 2013 Allocations are already allocated and priced as of Nov 2011
Long Term Auction Sequence 1: Sept 2012
  Fully allocate 2014 PCRRs as currently scheduled
  Auction 2013.1.1 (Jan-Jun 2013)
  Auction 2013.1.2 (Jul-Dec 2013)
  Auction 2014.1.3 (Jan-Jun 2014) (First Offering) Jan-Jun 2014 PCRR's are allocated but priced here
  Auction 2014.1.4 (Jul-Dec 2014) (First Offering) Jul-Dec 2014 PCRR's are allocated but priced here
Long Term Auction Sequence 2: May 2013
  Fully allocate 2015 PCRRs
  Auction 2013.2.1 (Jul-Dec 2013)
  Auction 2014.2.2 (Jan-Jun 2014)
  Auction 2014.2.3 (Jul-Dec 2014)
  Auction 2015.2.4 (Jan-Jun 2015) (First Offering) Jan-Jun 2015 allocations priced here
Long Term Auction Sequence 3: Sept 2013
  No allocations
  Auction 2014.3.1 (Jan-Jun 2014)
  Auction 2014.3.2 (Jul-Dec 2014)
  Auction 2015.3.3 (Jan-Jun 2015)
  Auction 2015.3.4 (Jul-Dec 2015) (First Offering) Jul-Dec 2015 allocations finally get priced here
Long Term Auction Sequence 4: May 2014
  Fully allocate 2016 PCRRs
  Auction 2014.4.1 (Jul-Dec 2014)
  Auction 2015.4.2 (Jan-Jun 2015)
  Auction 2015.4.3 (Jul-Dec 2015)
  Auction 2016.4.4 (Jan-Jun 2016) (First Offering) Jan-Jun 2016 allocations priced here
Long Term Auction Sequence 5: Sept 2014
  No allocations
  Auction 2015.5.1 (Jan-Jun 2015)
  Auction 2015.5.2 (Jul-Dec 2015)
  Auction 2016.5.3 (Jan-Jun 2016)
  Auction 2016.5.4 (Jul-Dec 2016) (First Offering) Jul-Dec 2015 allocations finally get priced here
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Other items considered at the CRR Subgroup

Long-Term Auction Sequence Structure

Detailed considerations for NPRR463 –

- 200,000 transaction limit applies to each six-month auction
 - Less likely to reach bid limit due to reduced auction period, i.e. six months versus a year
 - Recent ERCOT system upgrades may lead to an increase in the limit
- Each auction within a Long-Term Auction Sequence is optimized across six months separated by time-of-use
 - Credit submitted for each time-of-use
- The auction calendar must be approved by the TAC well in advance of each sequence
 - May 1 for fall sequence and Sept. 1 for spring sequence or 120 days prior to planned closure of bid window. Exception for sequences that auction 2013.
 - Once approved the calendar may not be accelerated
 - Between each auction ERCOT would post results and after invoices are released the credit is unlocked (same as today).
 - If delay occurs then subsequent auctions would shift back such that credit windows do not overlap.



Proposed capacity release schedule is a close equivalent to today's

Capacity Release

DC Energy proposal

- Proposed releases: 60%, 45%, 30%, 15%
- Continue with Monthly Auctions as is (each prompt month at 90%)

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  Fully allocate 2014 PCRRs as currently scheduled
  Auction 2013.1.1 (Jan-Jun 2013) 60%
  Auction 2013.1.2 (Jul-Dec 2013) 45%
  Auction 2014.1.3 (Jan-Jun 2014) 30% (First Offering) Jan-Jun 2014 PCRR's are allocated but priced here
  Auction 2014.1.4 (Jul-Dec 2014) 15% (First Offering) Jul-Dec 2014 PCRR's are allocated but priced here
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Baseloading for CRRs needs to be slightly modified to accommodate increased auctioning

Baseloading Issue

DC Energy Proposal

Diluting CRR baseloading no longer works

- Current practice of prorating previouslysold CRRs by the capacity percentage of the current auction will push awarded volumes far faster than expected
- Solution: Do not prorate existing CRR inventory when baseloading. Continue to prorate PCRRs as those are allocated 100% upfront.

PCRRs schedule is slightly adjusted

- Just as today, nominate PCRRs just before the first time those months are sold (before the first CRR Long-Term Auction, about 2 years out)
 - PCRR nomination would occur yearly

Baseloading Example

- No PCRRs involved, CRRAH bids for all MW -

Auction	Capacity	Sold Previously	Baseloading	Available	Now Consumed
First Offering	15	0.0	0.0	0	15.0
Second Offering	30	15.0	4.5	25.5	40.5
Third Offering	45	40.5	18.2	26.8	67.3
Frouth Offering	60	67.3	40.4	19.6	86.9
Fifith Offering	90	86.9	78.2	11.8	98.7



PCRR Schedule

- Example Schedule -

May 2013

Fully allocate 2015 PCRRs

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No allocations

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May 2014

Fully allocate 2016 PCRRs

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Seeking approval of NPRR 463 on expedited timeline

NPRR 463 Procedural Schedule

- Seeking approval prior to when activities for annual CRR Auction begin—
 - Requesting WMS endorsement of NPRR 463 on May, 9th
 - Requested urgent status for NPRR at the Protocol Revision Subcommittee on May 17th
 - Seeking TAC and Board of Directors approval in June
 - Consider impact analysis at the June 7th TAC meeting
 - Proposed auction structure was designed to be absorbed by existing ERCOT staff and systems.
 - The Board of Directors do not meet in July