

Review of February 2, 2011 Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Event

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President and Chief Executive Officer

Special Board of Directors Meeting February 14, 2011

ERCOT Public

Overview

- Introduction
- Extreme Weather Conditions
- Chronology of Operating Events
- ERCOT Execution of Energy Emergency Alert Plan
- Generation and Fuel
- Load Resource and Emergency Interruptible Load Service
- Market Impacts
- Credit Impacts
- Next Steps





Extreme Weather Conditions


A record-breaking arctic front was approaching prior to February 2, 2011

Extremely Cold Weather Grips Texas






Hourly Temperatures






07 February 2011

Hourly Wind Chill






Average Daily Temperatures - January & February, 1996 thru Feb 2, 2011




ERCOT Winter Peak Day

	<u>2010</u>		<u>2011</u>	
	Low	<u>High</u>	Low	<u>High</u>
Austin	15°F	35°F	18°F	28°F
Dallas	16°F	30°F	13°F	20°F
Houston	25°F	32°F	21°F	37°F



Houston







Chronology of Operating Events

ERCOT's Pre-Event Preparation

Jan 28-31: Transmission outages – cancelled, withdrawn or delayed

10-345 kV lines

27-138 kV lines

3-69 kV lines

2-345/138 kV autotransformer

1-138/69 kV autotransformer

Jan 31 at 6:30am:

Operating Condition Notice issued, "A cold front is approaching with temperatures anticipated to be in mid to low 18 degree range and maximum temperature expected to remain near or below freezing impacting 50% or more of major metropolitan areas. Estimated starting time Tuesday 2/1/11 09:00."

Feb 1 at 4:00pm:

13 Generating
Resources were
committed in the
Reliability Unit
Commitment process.

JAN 28 FEB 1

Jan 31 at 4:25am:

Requested MCSES 8 to be on-line by 10:00 on Feb 1; this generator has a long start-up lead time.

Jan 31 at 10:30am:


Requested LHSES 1 on-line burning oil.

Feb 1 at 09:05am:

Advisory issued, expecting temperatures in teens to low 20F; maximum temperatures near or below freezing impacting 50% or more of major metro areas.




ERCOT preparations






More than 8,000 megawatts (MW) of generation unexpectedly dropped offline overnight






The generation loss was system-wide and covered units of all ages and multiple types of fuel






ERCOT implemented emergency procedures when available generation was no longer sufficient to serve the load






A timeline of the emergency steps that were taken leading to rotating outages in ERCOT





The ERCOT System responded as expected





Maximum Load Shed Ordered by Transmission Owner

Transmission Owner	% Shed	MWs
		Shed
Austin Energy	3.96	158.4
American Electric Power	9.33	373.2
Brazos Electric Power Cooperative	4.62	184.8
City of Bryan	0.57	22.8
CenterPoint	26.56	1,062.4
City of College Station	0.29	11.6
CPS Energy	7.34	293.6
Denton	0.49	19.6
City of Garland	0.74	29.6
Greenville Electric Utility Service	0.17	6.8
LCRA	5.21	208.4
Magic Valley EC/South Texas EC	1.32	52.8
Oncor	35.55	1,422.0
Public Utility Board of Brownsville	0.43	17.2
Rayburn Country EC	0.93	37.2
Texas New Mexico Power	2.35	94.0
Tex-La	0.14	5.6
TOTAL		4,000

Megawatts ordered shed by each of the Transmission Owners; location of specific load shed is determined by the TO.

The amount shed is based on the TO's load ratio share.





Execution of Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Plan

The Energy Emergency Alert (EEA)

An orderly plan to reduce load during a shortage of generation

- Procedures for reducing System Demand in emergency situations
- Provides for maximum possible continuity of service while maintaining the integrity of the ERCOT System
- Reduces the chance of cascading outages
- Outlines when and how demand (load) can be curtailed



Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Process in the ERCOT Protocols

EEA procedure in the ERCOT Protocols defined by levels

- 1 Maintain 2,300 MW of on-line reserves
- Maintain 1,750 MW of on-line reserves. Interrupt loads providing Responsive Reserve Service.
- Interrupt loads providing Emergency Interruptible Load Service (EILS).
- Maintain System frequency at or above 59.8 Hz and instruct TSPs and DSPs to shed firm load in rotating blocks.




Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Communications Matrix

		System Operations	PUC Powerful Advice Web	Legal / Corporate	Media Notification
Level / Event	Triggering Event	Actions	Site	Communications Actions	(after PUC & others notified)
Advisory	reserves	Note on "PUCT Daily Report" email (distribution: PUC, ROS listserv [open list])	Conservation Encouraged - Normal Conditions	None	None
Watch	reserves	Start RMR units; Instruct QSEs to suspend generation testing; Deploy non-spin reserves; Dispatch quick start capacity	Conservation Encouraged - Normal Conditions	Notify GridAlert list* if potential for emergency situation.	None
Peak demand expectation		Notify Corporate Communications of high demand expectations	Conservation Needed -	Notify GridAlert list* if potential for emergency situation.	Release to media, if appropriate
Firm load shed	utility to drop load	Notify Corporate Communications of firm load shed via emergency notification system	Conservation Needed - Power Watch (optional)		Release to media, if appropriate
EEA Level 1	< 2300 MW adjusted reserves	Use capacity available from DC ties; Dispatch uncommitted units	Conservation Needed - Power Watch	Notify GridAlert list* with summary of situation	Release to media, if appropriate
EEA Level 2A MEDIUM potential for firm load shed	reserves	Deploy interruptible loads (LAARs); Begin block-load transfers of load to neighboring grids	Conservation Needed - Power Watch		Release to media, if appropriate
EEA Level 2B HIGH potential for firm load shed	To maintain system frequency at 60 Hz or adjusted reserves trending downward or not available	Deploy Emergency Interruptible Loads (EILS) if available	Conservation Critical - Power Warning	Notify GridEmergency list** - plus State Operations Center (SOC) with "High Priority"	Release to media, if not already done
EEA Level 3		Instruct transmission operators to shed firm load via rotating outages in blocks of 100 MW	Power Emergency - Rotating Outages	Notify GridEmergency list**	Release to media
Cancellation of EEA Level 3	Frequency restoration	n/a	Conservation Needed - Power Watch	Notify GridEmergency list**	Release to media
Cancellation of EEA	Grid conditions normal	n/a	Conservation Encouraged - Normal Conditions	Notify GridAlert list**	Update media as needed



ERCOT experienced communications challenges due to the rapidlyunfolding events





Communications Improvements

ERCOT experienced external communications issues during the event that highlighted the need for improved communication with a variety of audiences, including:

- State Operations Center (SOC)
- Public Utility Commission (PUC)
- Board of Directors
- Media
- Market Participants
- Public

The Executive leadership is undertaking a complete review of communications during grid emergencies and expects to report findings to the Board within a few weeks.



Communications Improvements

ERCOT has immediately implemented fixes to some of these issues, which include:

- The process to notify the SOC and the PUC of entry into emergency grid situations has been automated and SOC and PUC will receive notification of pending grid emergencies directly from the control room, rather than wait for that information to filter through a third-party.
- ERCOT will have a person inside the SOC going forward prior to and during emergency situations, to ensure emergency personnel have a contact and are getting the latest information.
- All Board members email addresses have been added to the "Grid Emergency" list, which is sent in the event of a grid emergency (this includes the period before rotating outages are implemented when it appears there is a high likelihood of their occurrence).
- ERCOT will ensure that all market participants are aware that the MIS Secure system allows them to receive real-time grid information directly.



Communications Improvements

As part of the Executive Review of communications, a full emergency communications plan is being developed that will include the use of at least the following:

- The use of social-networking media to reach all audiences quickly.
- Implementing a phone bank during grid emergencies to ensure the public, media, market participants and others can get information related to a grid emergency in a timely manner.
- Changes to the media response policy to potentially include real-time interviews with radio/TV during grid emergencies.
- Additions to <u>www.ercot.com</u>, including real-time grid information on the homepage, so that audiences can keep themselves apprised of the grid's status easily






Generation and Fuel

Forced Generation Outages by Season

Forced Generation Outage Capacity


December-February for 2005-2011



Note: Values represent cumulative forced outage capacity for each day.




Generation Outage Capacity by Unit Age





Forced Generation Outages

Forced Outage Capacity on 50 Coldest Days 2005 - 2011




Note:

- Values represent cumulative forced outage capacity for each day.
- •Temperatures are an average of the average daily temperatures from Dallas (DFW), Austin (AUS), and Houston (IAH).




Generation Forced Outages by Fuel Category





The role of wind





Note: All data are hourly averages obtained from COPs, and EMMS.

Interagency Cooperation

- ERCOT was advised that some units could generate more power if additional natural gas became available to the unit or if generators could temporarily surpass air emissions limits.
- PUC and RRC Commissioners and Staff worked cooperatively to assess specific situations and work with industry on natural gas issues.
- PUC and TCEQ Commissioners and Staff worked with ERCOT to develop a plan for encouraging addition of available generation resources to the ERCOT electric grid.





Load Resource and Emergency Interruptible Load Service

Load Resources and EILS Deployment

Deployed Load Resources

- •888.5 MW providing Responsive Reserve
- •881.7 MW responded
- •99.2% performance after 10 minutes (95% required by Protocols)

Additional Load Resources tripped

- •200 MW
- •Not providing Responsive Reserve
- Voluntary

Load Resources Recalled

5:24am

6:00am

2:02pm

FEB 2

FEB 3, 10 AM EEA 2A ENDS & EILS RECALLED

5:49am

Deployed EILS

- •384.2 MW
- Actual performance will be known when meter data available

8:53am

Deployed Additional EILS

- •83.5 MW
- Became available as we crossed into Business Hours time period



Emergency Interruptible Load Service (EILS)

EILS is procured for 4-month Contract Periods

- 4 Time Periods within each Contract Period
- 28-hour event occurred on 2nd day of Feb.-May Contract Period and crossed all Time Periods
- Costs for Feb.-May 2011 Contract Period:

Time Period	MW Procured	Cost (\$/MW/Hr)
Non-Business Hours (overnights & weekends)	384.2*	\$6.37
Business Hours 1 (0800-1300)	467.47 *	\$6.39
Business Hours 2 (1300-1400)	470.7*	\$6.60
Business Hours 3 (1400-2000)	472.6*	\$6.78




^{*} Actual performance will be known when meter data available




Market Impacts

Pricing Summary first week of February






DAM Summary






DAM Cost Comparison during Feb 2&3




Left graphic shows typical \$20-60 costs MW in DAM (mostly energy) Feb 2 DAM prices/costs go to \$40-140 anticipating cold snap Feb 3 DAM reacts to real-time, costs for DAM jump to \$180-\$1,000

Cost trend the same, but doubles and then 10x for Feb 2, 3
Feb 2&3 costs of A/S and Congestion higher proportion of costs
A/S depleted and costs much higher (trade-off with energy)
Congestion costs increase with price separation
Price separation is typical, but prices high











DAM Summary OD 2/3


- High costs of Ancillary Services procured for Load (\$60 million)
 - DAM was insufficient in AS Offers for this day, which raised the clearing prices significantly, most notably for Responsive Reserve






DAM Bid/Offer vs Energy cleared Feb 2&3







Feb 2 DAM decreased supply but most of demand met

Feb 3 DAM further decreased supply, and very high demand not met









Credit Impacts

Impact of February 2, 2011 Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) Event on Credit

- Certain portions of the credit calculations in the ERCOT Protocols use recent history to estimate forward risk
 - While this generally produces reasonable results, the underlying assumptions were reviewed by ERCOT given the unusual activity beginning February 2nd
- After its review, ERCOT made adjustments to collateral requirements to mitigate the impact of the EEA event beginning February 2nd on the estimates of forward risk
 - The Protocols provide ERCOT with the discretion to adjust exposure calculations to address unusual situations as they arise
 - ERCOT ensured that an estimate of incurred activity (including the unusual activity on Feb 2nd) was collateralized while adjusting calculations to mitigate the impact of high prices on the estimation of forward risk



ERCOT's Use of Discretion - Considerations

- ERCOT took the following factors into consideration when determining what adjustments to make to the credit calculations
 - <u>Timing</u>: The need to make changes in a rapid and timely manner since credit exposure calculation impacts the Counter-Party's (CP's) ability to participate in the Day-Ahead Market (DAM)
 - Different from Zonal
 - Transparency: The need to be transparent so that the market understood ERCOT's actions and could shadow
 - Global adjustments; issuance of market notices
 - Collateralization:
 - Historical Risk: The need to collateralize for an estimate of incurred activity



ERCOT's Use of Discretion - Considerations (Continued)

- Collateralization (cont):
 - <u>Forward Exposure</u>: The need to reduce or eliminate the impact on calculations of forward exposure due to the unusual nature of:
 - Day-Ahead activity on February 3rd and 4th
 - » Day Ahead Market Extrapolated (DALE)
 - RT prices incurred on February 2nd and 3rd and
 - » Aggregate Incremental Liability (AIL)
 - » Average Daily Transaction Extrapolated (ADTE)

- Total Potential Exposure (TPE) market wide at February 3, 2011
 - w/o adjustment

\$686 million

w/ adjustment

\$420 million



Market Participant Default and Mass Transition

- Defaulted under its Agreement with ERCOT on February 9, 2011
- Qualified Scheduling Entity and Load Serving Entity
- 7, 743 Retail Customers
- Load approximately 383 MWh per day

ERCOT is working closely with the PUCT and Market Participants to ensure an efficient transfer of customers from the REP to other Competitive Retailers.





Next Steps

Investigations currently underway

- ERCOT Compliance staff internal review
- Investigation regarding potential violations of state statutes, regulations, and ERCOT market rules initiated by the PUCT. Investigation will be conducted by the Independent Market Monitor (IMM) and Texas Reliability Entity (TRE).
- Investigations of ERCOT and market participants regarding potential violations of federal reliability rules are expected.



ERCOT's next steps

ERCOT will continue to review the actions leading up to this event and the handling of event itself.

- ERCOT is providing information to assist in the investigations currently underway.
- ERCOT will be an active participant in the discussion related to the adequate weatherization of generation units.
- ERCOT will work with transmission providers to study the potential use of advanced meters in selective load reduction.
- ERCOT is reviewing all communications policies related to grid emergencies.
 - ERCOT has already implemented changes that will provide automated notice to the State Operations Center (SOC) and the PUC.
 - ERCOT will implement a "phone bank" that will temporarily increase staff during emergency situations to respond to incoming calls.

