PRR661

Title:	SCE Performance Enforcement Criteria
Next Group:
Next Step:	Filing at the PUCT
Status:	Approved on 06/20/2006

Date	Gov Body		Next Steps
06/20/2006	Board of Directors	Approved	Filing at the PUCT
06/01/2006	TAC	Recommended for Approval	Board consideration and review of IA/CBA by PRS
05/18/2006	PRS	Recommended for Approval	TAC consideration
04/21/2006	PRS		Review of WMS recommendation and language consideration.
04/21/2006	PRS		Initial review

Date	Gov Body	Motion	Result	Against	Abstentions
06/20/2006	Board of Directors	Approve as recommended by TAC	Passed	0	0
06/01/2006	TAC	On 6/1/06, TAC voted on a motion to recommend approval of PRR662 as amended by TAC, including the revisions and implementation assumptions numbered 1-15 presented in ERCOTâ??s comments. TAC also directed WMS to provide a methodology to establish the appropriate level for the scaling factor used in the SCE Performance Charge calculation defined by PRR661. WMS is to provide this methodology by the August TAC meeting.	Passed	1 Independent REP	1 IOU
05/18/2006	PRS	Recommendation for approval as revised by PRS and WMS comments.	Passed		3 Independent REP (2) and MOU (1)
04/21/2006	PRS	Rable consideration of PRR661, along with PRRs 586, 649, 656, and 662, until the May 18, 2006 PRS Meeting. The motion passed with two abstentions from the Independent Power Marketer and Independent Generator market segments. All market segments were present for the vote.	Passed	0	2 Independent Generator (1) and Independent Power Marketer (1).

Status:	Approved
Date Posted:	04/07/2006
Sponsor:	PSEG Texgen I
Urgent:	Yes
Sections:	6.10.5.3, 6.10.12.1 (new)
Description:	This revision creates the criteria for SCE Performance Enforcement.
Reason:	This performance enforcement criterion implements a financial incentive for a Resource QSE to minimize SCE. This mechanism ratchets out a Resource QSEâ??s ability to sell Regulation Services and ratchets in a Regulation Service obligation if the Resource QSE is unable to consistently perform their obligation schedules. This mechanism eliminates the shock to the market created when a large Resource QSE is instantaneously eliminated from the Ancillary Services market due to failing the SCE performance matrix that is in the present Protocols. This mechanism allows the market to slowly adjust as non-performers are ratcheted out of the market and good-performers increase their sales to the market. This mechanism transfers some of the present load Regulation Service obligation to generators that fail to perform at a pre-determined level.